Print Page - EU on CSAM: "Big Brother is watching you" (Peter Sund)

Title: EU on CSAM: "Big Brother is watching you" (Peter Sund)
Post by: AribertDeckers on July 12, 2026, 01:14:28 AM

12.7.2026
Update 14.7.2026
EU on CSAM: "Big Brother is watching you" (Peter Sund)

[*quote*]
-----------------------
Puheenaihe @puheenaihefi
Translated from Finnish

EU on CSAM: "Big Brother is watching you" (Peter Sund) | Topic 570

▶️ EPISODE
What is the EU's proposed regulation to combat sexual violence against children about? What problems and risks are associated with the proposed regulation?

In the studio: Peter Sund, CEO of Kyberala ry. The episode was recorded on 24.10.2024.

⌚ TIMESTAMPS
0:00 "Trojan horse"
2:04 Kyberala ry
4:51 CSAM
10:40 Privacy
16:33 Service providers
18:48 Companies
20:31 China
22:51 Stalinism
25:02 Freedom
27:26 Authorities
30:45 Surveillance
37:48 Errors in automation
42:23 Apple
46:46 Open source
48:26 Signal
51:15 Russia
54:56 Hacking
56:56 "Honey pot"
1:00:36 Corruption
1:05:41 Totalitarianism
1:11:40 Politics
1:16:08 Mass surveillance
1:21:28 Trust
1:26:18 Legislative proposal
1:29:41 Digital identity
1:32:41 Prevention
1:36:48 Police undercover operations
1:41:31 Crime threshold
1:52:05 Referral to treatment
1:56:00 Vigilantism
2:00:34 Ineffectiveness
2:06:07 Artificial intelligence
2:09:53 Generative artificial intelligence
2:23:31 Societal vs. private

🎙� GUEST
Peter Sund

🐵 HOST
Rami Kurimo

🎥 PRODUCTION
Puhemedia 2025

Rate this translation:
Embedded video
[VIDEO:
(https://pbs.twimg.com/amplify_video_thumb/2075619646280024064/img/CyHQZWiPmmFtvBlg?format=jpg&name=small) (https://video.twimg.com/amplify_video/2075619646280024064/vid/avc1/640x360/oj8Kj8oXfS4zMgVP.mp4)

https://video.twimg.com/amplify_video/2075619646280024064/vid/avc1/640x360/oj8Kj8oXfS4zMgVP.mp4 ]

6:49 PM · Jul 10, 2026
27.5K Views

-----------------------
MaaTuska 🇫🇮 @maatuska_t
Translated from Finnish

At the same time, small children are already conditioned in daycares to masturbate and such. Quite the setup.
Rate this translation:

Quote
https://x.com/maatuska_t/status/1752647757435666699
[***quote***]
-----------------------
MaaTuska 🇫🇮 @maatuska_t
Jan 31, 2024
Translated from Finnish

Children aged 0-4 must be told about masturbation in early childhood education and taught to recognize their gender identity. So, for 0-4 year olds! Why is using common sense not allowed in this country, but all recommendations from WHO, UN, etc., go through like a hot knife through butter 🤬

https://www.julkari.fi/server/api/core/bitstreams/8eaac4bb-14bb-4260-9bc8-398e58c47d8b/content

Image
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GFKcbaXWQAEqv4g?format=png&name=900x900)

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GFKcbaXWQAEqv4g?format=png&name=900x900

11:59 AM · Jan 31, 2024
43.1K Views
-----------------------
[***/quote***]

6:33 PM · Jul 11, 2026
224 Views
-----------------------
[*/quote*]

14.7.2026
Update:

https://x.com/linuxuser1996/status/2076924174040265040

[*quote*]
-----------------------
𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑥 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟 @linuxuser1996

Countries where a YouTube video critizing EU's Chat Control has been banned.

Image
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HNK3hpnWMAA7D1M?format=jpg&name=small)

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HNK3hpnWMAA7D1M?format=jpg&name=4096x4096

8:58 AM · Jul 14, 2026
213.5K Views
-----------------------
[*/quote*]

Title: Re: EU on CSAM: "Big Brother is watching you" (Peter Sund)
Post by: AribertDeckers on July 12, 2026, 11:26:51 PM

13.7.2026

Transcript of the video, made by TurboScribe.

The duration is too much for getting a transcript in one single piece, so I had to divide in several pieces. This is the first one.

1 FINLAND CHAT CONTROL 2024 oj8Kj8oXfS4zMgVP

(0:01) At the moment, the EU has been planning for some time (0:06) such a bill that, in practice, (0:13) breaks one of the cornerstones of a modern digital society, (0:18) if it were to be implemented in such a form as it is now (0:24) in the EU member states. (0:29) The question is the bill on the repeal of child sexual (0:34) online-based consent, which is, of course, (0:39) very important and commendable from the inside or the objectives, (0:44) but at the same time it is a matter of the fact that (0:50) we have a Trojan horse whose insides we don't have (0:57) a clear understanding or knowledge of. (0:59) We only know that we have a Trojan horse and it always contains the danger (1:05) that there is something bad or harmful inside (1:10) when it crawls into the walls.
(1:14) In your opinion, is the old saying that the road to hell is paved (1:21) at the right time? (1:22) Yes, this is precisely the question. (1:26) All right. (1:28) Kyperala ry's CEO, Peter, welcome to the Pohjanmaa podcast.
(1:32) Thank you very much. (1:33) The election podcast is now running. (1:40) If you want your own podcast episode, contact (1:43) vaalit at puhemedia.fi. (1:46) In the first episode, I interviewed Niko Haapala.
(1:50) Niko Haapalainen is the mayoral candidate in Tampere. (1:54) If you are from Tampere, watch Niko's interview. (1:57) So if you are from Tampere, watch Niko's interview.
(2:02) The link can be found in the episode description. (2:04) Today we will talk about the CSAM legislation. (2:12) Then we will talk about privacy and how far we will get (2:16) from these topics at the end of the episode.
(2:19) But do you want to briefly tell your own background, (2:21) who you are and where you come from? (2:23) Yes, of course. (2:25) I am an organization like Kyperala ry. (2:29) I am its CEO.
(2:32) We are the leading cybersecurity company in Finland. (2:40) Our members are all economic actors (2:45) who produce cybersecurity for the benefit of others. (2:50) This includes a broad understanding of what all (2:53) is included in cybersecurity.
(2:55) Of course, it's not just products and services, (3:01) but also, for example, research results (3:04) and professional skills. (3:08) So these are the things that our members (3:11) produce for the benefit of society and society. (3:14) How did you find your way to Kyperala ry? (3:22) Well, my own story is that I've been working (3:26) for security my whole life.
(3:29) So my whole career has been somehow, (3:32) in English it's a bit clearer than the word (3:36) safety and security. (3:38) I've been on the security side, (3:40) so this so-called hard security. (3:43) It's a bit of a bad word in Finnish.
(3:45) But I've been in the private security field. (3:48) Then I've been a civil servant, (3:51) as we now call it, (3:53) a civil man in the field of internal security (3:57) and law enforcement. (3:59) And most of it, yes, (4:02) with international things that cross borders, (4:07) in international organizations like the UK, the EU, (4:13) and the like.
(4:15) I moved to this position (4:18) actually together with our member company, (4:21) a technology company called Värtsilä Oy. (4:24) It's probably familiar to many. (4:26) Maybe some ships will come to mind, (4:28) because it's a fairly long and traditional company.
(4:31) Soon it will be close to 200 years of history. (4:35) But it's a technology company that operates (4:40) in the sectors of commercial shipping (4:41) and energy industry. (4:46) I was in the business security department (4:50) All right.
(4:51) But yeah, (4:52) if we go back to the CSM legislation, (4:57) what exactly is the issue here? (5:00) And why have we wanted to move forward (5:02) with this type of legislation in general? (5:04) Why have we wanted to move forward? (5:07) Well, of course, it starts with a sad fact (5:14) that there is malicious activity on the Internet (5:20) that targets and victims are minors. (5:26) Of course, to put it precisely, (5:29) the target of the act is the sexual abuse. (5:34) So, typically, adults who try to (5:40) maybe nationally, (5:41) we could talk about child porn or something like that, (5:45) but it's not a very suitable or good term.
(5:49) But anyway, (5:51) there is a lot to worry about in the Internet. (5:58) So, basically, we could say that we have (6:01) two kinds of entities, (6:06) one of which is this kind of (6:10) child sexual abuse, (6:13) as described, the production of material. (6:17) And the other is then (6:19) a kind of indifferent interaction, (6:23) where, for example, an adult tries to (6:26) get close to minors in this kind of (6:27) sexual abuse and get into interaction (6:32) and doing with children.
(6:37) And how is this CSM legislation now then, (6:40) or how is it designed to then try to (6:43) enforce these things? (6:45) Well, of course, there have been valuable and perhaps (6:49) even positive goals in the beginning. (6:54) But the unfortunate thing is, in that sense, (6:56) that when this is the EU legislation and (6:59) the European Commission, which gives (7:02) legislation to us in Europe, (7:04) it has been divided a bit in the same way (7:06) as we do in Finland, that we have (7:09) a state council or a government. (7:12) So, the government has been divided into (7:13) such administrative branches, i.e. ministries.
(7:16) And the European Union operates in the same (7:20) kind of mechanism, that there are such (7:24) main branches in the Commission. (7:26) And this internal security, (7:30) which includes, for example, (7:31) crime prevention, is then one of these (7:34) main branches. (7:36) And of course it has a little different (7:37) goals than others.
(7:40) But in this digital world, it is (7:47) very difficult, if not impossible, (7:51) in some way, clearly, to prepare (7:56) digital legislation for other (7:57) interest groups or these (7:59) administrative branches. (8:03) Which is also a question here, (8:05) because this is a question of (8:06) network-related child sexual (8:09) abuse. (8:10) So, somehow, (8:15) we could leave out (8:19) other such important (8:21) perspectives or (8:23) influential adventures.
(8:26) And that is one of the (8:28) starting points, where things (8:31) go wrong to some extent, if I (8:33) say so directly. (8:35) So, this is our previous (8:39) advice to our important and (8:41) close Western neighbor, Sweden, (8:44) the former commissioner, (8:48) to move forward. (8:51) And there may have been (8:53) some kind of realism (8:56) in promoting it.
(9:02) And it has been taken into account (9:03) such completely central and important (9:05) things, which, for example, other (9:08) main branches have kept as (9:12) such a good digital life (9:17) cornerstone or basic structure. (9:20) And what does this CSM bill now (9:24) actually or concretely (9:26) include? (9:28) Well, in the bill there are (9:32) perhaps several such (9:35) as a whole, but if I (9:40) focus on those perhaps (9:41) such as the most important or (9:44) such as why this discussion (9:47) is generally held or should be held, (9:49) then there is (9:53) one of these central ideas and (9:56) proposals is one where (10:02) digital messaging services (10:05) are built, i.e. (10:07) messaging applications (10:07) familiar to all users, (10:11) i.e. WhatsApps and Messengers (10:14) and Signals and all the others (10:18) that are understood as (10:22) such messaging applications, (10:23) such a monitoring mechanism, i.e. (10:26) such a big brother monitoring (10:31) type capacity, where (10:34) security officials could (10:36) monitor the content of the message. (10:40) Is this in any way different from (10:43) if we think of this kind of (10:45) traditional letter sending, (10:47) that then when you send a letter to (10:49) another, there would be an official (10:51) who would first read the letter, (10:53) whether this is now acceptable (10:54) content and then if it is, then (10:56) forward and if it is not, then (10:58) the next action.
(11:00) Yes, in fact, that is a very good (11:02) note. We have used a very (11:05) similar comparison, because (11:08) in detail, which is (11:12) central and perhaps not even (11:15) completely, let's say, (11:19) modern, such a liberal (11:22) democracy-based (11:26) democratic system, (11:28) the core of the values of the (11:30) is the protection of individual life, (11:32) and this has been fought for, for (11:34) example, in Europe even (11:36) later in the Middle Ages, (11:38) so that we have reached this point. (11:43) And the principle that is (11:48) the most noticeable (11:50) is the confidentiality of letters, (11:55) which we also have in the (11:57) Constitution, of course, (11:58) written, but when societies (12:01) develop and technology develops, (12:03) and now we have digital (12:04) messaging tools and means, (12:06) that we no longer send a lot of (12:08) paper letters nowadays.
(12:10) Of course, I think that quite a lot of (12:12) them still get more or less (12:15) from official sources, usually in (12:17) a form of a bill or somewhere else, (12:20) but everyone can see that (12:23) the content of the letter is (12:26) unbreakable. If it's not (12:28) Christmas card health or (12:29) something else, then it's (12:31) closed in a blue-covered paper (12:33) cover, which you can't (12:36) read, for example, against the light. (12:38) And if it's something very (12:39) arbitrary, for example, (12:40) the identification number of a bank card, (12:44) which the bank sends, then it's still (12:47) done in such a way that (12:48) some kind of black mess is put (12:50) around it, so that it's not (12:52) even possible to study it (12:53) on a very bright light table, (12:56) what the serial number would be.
(12:58) I think that this is (12:59) familiar to almost everyone. (13:02) And this unbreakability of (13:04) confidentiality of letters is (13:06) just such a central (13:11) principle, (13:12) for which Finland has also (13:14) acted for a very long time. (13:17) And in that sense, (13:19) your comparison is very (13:20) good, because (13:21) this bill now contains (13:24) this kind of idea, (13:26) where (13:29) some official (13:31) in some way (13:34) would study in advance (13:36) the content of the message (13:38) to ensure (13:40) that it is (13:42) then (13:43) within the limits of the law (13:46) acceptable content.
(13:48) And the latest version (13:50) of this bill (13:52) is now (13:53) one in which it would be done (13:55) precisely as this (13:57) content study would be done (14:00) before the (14:01) letter is closed into the (14:03) envelope and then the (14:05) adhesive surface is attached. (14:06) But is there any difference (14:09) on the practical level in the end? (14:11) Is the content of the message (14:13) studied before the letter (14:14) or after the letter? (14:17) Well, no. (14:18) That is of course (14:20) the challenge here.
(14:22) Previously, this bill (14:25) was (14:26) to some extent (14:28) if you can even say (14:30) that it was even worse. (14:33) Because (14:34) the fact that (14:36) the citizens would observe (14:39) from the starting point (14:41) that it doesn't matter (14:42) if there is even a reason (14:44) to suspect anyone (14:45) of a criminal act, (14:48) it is enough (14:50) alarming already as it is. (14:52) But in that sense, perhaps in a technical sense (14:54) it was even worse (14:55) a little while ago (14:58) when the idea was (14:59) that in addition to studying (15:01) the content of the message (15:04) it would be done, for example (15:06) in the digital sense (15:07) putting the closed envelope (15:10) is the same thing as (15:12) hiding the content of the message.
(15:14) So that the third party (15:16) cannot read it (15:18) or find out its content. (15:21) That is precisely (15:22) the key issue here. (15:25) And the earlier (15:26) idea was that (15:29) this hiding would (15:30) still have been a (15:32) powerful element of (15:34) privacy protection.
(15:37) Was there (15:38) in the earlier bill (15:40) somehow the idea that (15:43) some kind of back door (15:46) had to be built into that hiding (15:46) so that the officials (15:48) could get into it? (15:50) Yes, exactly. (15:53) Of course, we can always (15:56) wonder or even wonder (15:58) when there is a question from the back door (16:00) and when there is already (16:02) some other way (16:04) or means to open (16:06) the hiding. But all in all (16:08) the following would have (16:10) been exactly like that.
(16:12) So we would not have had (16:13) that strong (16:16) concept of (16:17) hiding in terms (16:20) that on the outside (16:22) level, that is, (16:24) the sender of the message (16:25) and the intended recipient (16:27) who else does not have (16:30) access to (16:30) the content of the message. (16:34) How does (16:35) the current bill go (16:37) that what (16:39) level is in practice (16:41) responsible for (16:42) that the message somehow should (16:45) or that the message would then be (16:46) one that the officials should be able to (16:49) in some way or that the officials (16:51) should be able to get hold of? (16:52) Is it so that (16:54) the developers of the individual application (16:55) are responsible for developing it or (16:59) is it (17:00) Google's or Apple's (17:02) application stores are responsible for (17:04) taking care that there are only certain (17:06) applications or how would that go? (17:08) Well, (17:10) in the latest version, (17:13) if we (17:14) can be (17:16) good at focusing on (17:18) where we are now, (17:19) then (17:21) the idea is (17:23) that (17:25) the providers of (17:27) these message services, (17:30) which are often (17:31) precisely like commercial (17:33) companies, like (17:35) Apple or (17:38) Meta or (17:39) Google or (17:42) or (17:43) tens and hundreds (17:45) of other companies (17:48) provide different services, (17:49) because, for example, (17:51) there is a lot in the (17:53) message between companies, (17:54) and all those who are (17:57) in the educational (17:58) or work life (18:01) also recognize (18:02) these kind of (18:04) daily applications (18:06) like Teams (18:08) and (18:09) this kind of (18:13) services, (18:14) then the providers of (18:16) these services, which (18:18) have developed (18:21) and brought (18:22) to be used, (18:24) they would be required (18:27) to include (18:28) this kind of (18:31) monitoring component. (18:33) I would like to use the word component, (18:36) even though it is of course (18:36) a software component, (18:38) but still a component (18:40) with which (18:42) the messages could be (18:44) processed in this (18:45) kind of pre-monitoring (18:48) way.
(18:49) So it's not just that (18:51) in this bill (18:54) individual people, (18:55) or if we talk about individual people, (18:57) the message between them (19:00) could be monitored, but (19:01) also the message between companies (19:04) would become such that (19:05) the officials could monitor it. (19:08) Yes, in practice (19:09) this would be the case, because (19:12) even in the latest (19:13) bill, (19:16) this has (19:17) perhaps been developed a little (19:19) earlier, when (19:21) at some point (19:23) this thought was not used at all. (19:25) But now it has been (19:27) incorporated a little into the (19:29) bill, (19:32) mainly from that (19:33) point of view, that (19:34) the message between (19:35) companies (19:38) would not necessarily (19:40) belong to the (19:42) monitoring (19:42) component.
(19:44) But of course (19:46) it does not affect (19:48) the reality, because (19:51) companies are not the message (19:53) in the middle. There are people (19:56) representing (19:58) companies and other organizations, (20:00) for example (20:02) companies or (20:03) third sector organizations. (20:07) And of course (20:08) the other point of view is (20:10) that it is very difficult to know (20:14) who all (20:15) these officials are.
(20:16) Even just the associations, (20:18) here in Finland, (20:19) do we have a world record (20:21) in terms of people? We have (20:22) probably half a million registered (20:25) associations here in Finland, (20:27) and in many of them there may be (20:28) only a few individuals. (20:31) How well do you think (20:33) politicians in Finland (20:35) or around the world (20:36) know or understand (20:40) where this (20:40) question really comes from? (20:42) I have to say that this is (20:44) just my personal opinion, but it feels (20:46) pretty strange that we would be (20:48) building, as you said, (20:50) a big brother monitoring agency (20:52) at the same time as Western countries (20:54) criticize what is happening in China. (20:56) It seems to me that we are (20:57) terrorizing the fact that China (20:59) has now become a digital (21:02) dictatorship or (21:03) a digital authoritarian (21:06) police state, where (21:08) we can, under surveillance, (21:10) make sure that the opposition (21:11) doesn't say anything bad and the (21:13) citizens stay in line.
(21:15) You could say that this is a digital (21:17) police state, and at the same time (21:20) in the EU we are planning (21:22) something similar. (21:23) Yes, (21:25) it certainly is. (21:27) Yes, (21:29) for China it is (21:31) easy to say that (21:32) it is not just a (21:35) digital dictatorship, but (21:36) a dictatorship that is also (21:38) digital, and a (21:41) fairly large part of (21:43) that dictatorship is still being (21:44) implemented by means of (21:44) modern technology.
(21:50) China is (21:51) a good example of (21:53) such a penetrating (21:55) totalitarian (21:56) transnational society, where (21:58) not only other thoughts (22:01) are prevented, limited (22:03) and monitored, (22:05) but also that there is (22:07) enough so-called (22:08) late thinking. (22:10) And (22:10) those who have visited China, (22:14) or maybe not visited, but have lived in China, (22:16) or have spent (22:18) more time there, (22:19) people know well that (22:22) there is, for example, (22:24) one such central (22:26) application, app, (22:28) which is used in mobile devices, (22:30) this WeChat application, (22:33) which is a message (22:34) application, in the same way (22:36) as the ones we use (22:37) here in Finland and (22:40) Europe and (22:42) elsewhere. But its (22:43) property is precisely that it is a perfect (22:45) transnational application, (22:48) that is, all messages are (22:51) So what if someone then (22:53) thought, does it matter (22:55) if guests monitor, that (22:57) basically I don't make any laws, (22:59) even if I read all the messages? (23:02) Well, yes.
(23:04) It is, (23:05) it is an (23:07) attractive (23:08) initial thought, but (23:10) I would say that it is (23:12) maybe a little, or quite a lot (23:14) like short-sighted, (23:16) that it is maybe a little (23:18) like it affects the thought (23:21) like (23:23) like, for example, (23:25) the emotional reaction when (23:26) someone touches a hot pan (23:28) in an accident, and it (23:29) goes away quite quickly, you don't have to (23:32) consider whether it hurt or not, (23:34) that it is quite a (23:36) carefree reaction, because (23:38) it leaves a kind of (23:40) assumption that the (23:42) whole society and all its members (23:44) would be at all (23:45) times (23:48) completely the same. (23:50) And (23:51) if someone (23:53) doesn't have anything that (23:55) no one else wants to know, it doesn't (23:57) mean that we all have (23:59) such a situation. (24:01) I myself (24:04) admit that I have (24:05) sent, for example, (24:06) very close (24:08) messages to people that (24:10) I would hope would (24:12) be seen or received (24:17) And (24:18) in a completely opposite way, of course, (24:21) when the question is not (24:22) whether it is a message (24:24) that has been sent from (24:26) point A to point B, (24:29) but (24:30) there is a interaction behind it.
(24:33) So if we think (24:34) about whether there would be (24:36) such an OK, such a model (24:39) that we had in the Stalinist (24:41) Soviet Union, where (24:42) at the dinner table (24:43) around the table (24:46) did not dare to speak (24:49) honestly about (24:50) their own opinions, because (24:52) they could never know who (24:54) was next to report (24:56) then to the (24:58) supervisors (25:00) what has been said at the table. (25:01) And if you still think about (25:04) close people, (25:06) or let's say now maybe (25:07) if it's a matter of a couple of relationships or (25:09) otherwise intimate, (25:12) then such a message (25:13) that would it be the kind that (25:15) would want to be seen by the supervisors (25:17) that there is no law (25:19) happening, then in the same way (25:21) you could ask if they would like (25:23) their own bathroom (25:25) or their own bedroom (25:28) surveillance system (25:29) that the supervisor can only (25:32) check because there is no law (25:34) in place. Would it be (25:36) the same that when (25:37) they were watching in peace, (25:39) how many people would be ready (25:41) to watch their own bathroom (25:43) and their own bedroom? (25:45) Yes, just like that.
(25:47) It's just that in a certain way (25:49) the idea that it's easy (25:53) to forget (25:54) how we got (25:55) to this (25:56) level of happiness (25:58) and well-being (26:00) that we are now. (26:02) For example, Finland is (26:03) a world's happiest country (26:06) for quite a few years already. (26:08) The Finns could of course (26:10) wonder how this is (26:12) possible, but (26:13) in the other world, (26:15) when you look a little further, (26:18) it's better to do something (26:20) right here.
(26:22) And one of those things is (26:24) freedom of speech and freedom of expression (26:26) and freedom of expression in a way (26:28) that we can have (26:30) simple thoughts. And the other (26:32) is of course that (26:34) we are not for the state. (26:37) We are for the state.
(26:38) So this is (26:40) the idea of the structure of (26:42) society, that the state is (26:44) founded so that some (26:47) common things (26:48) can be handled better, (26:50) for example health care (26:52) or something like that. (26:55) Collect tax (26:57) and distribute it (26:58) according to the law (27:01) to those in need (27:03) or let's say (27:05) to those in need of help and support (27:06) and so on. (27:08) But at the bottom and at the back (27:10) there is precisely (27:12) this idea of freedom (27:15) and that (27:16) a person (27:19) has free will (27:21) and then there should be (27:22) as much freedom as possible.
(27:26) I feel (27:27) that in Finland for quite a long time (27:29) there is such an idea that (27:31) the state and (27:33) officials work right and well. (27:36) And (27:37) I'm not saying that it's just a bad thing. (27:40) If we look (27:41) at how well (27:44) things work, (27:45) in Finland many things work well.
(27:47) If there is a conversation with people (27:49) who live (27:51) in Southern Europe or even (27:53) in Central Europe, opening (27:54) a single bank account (27:57) or dealing with officials (27:58) may be much more challenging. (28:01) It's more about whether the (28:04) official is interested (28:05) in doing something on the other side of the table. (28:07) In Finland we are used to (28:09) that things generally work (28:11) and we have strong trust.
(28:13) But I feel that the downside (28:14) is that we somehow (28:17) trust it (28:18) even a little bit blue-eyed that (28:20) if the officials had (28:23) some tools that could be used (28:25) wrongly, they would not be used (28:28) wrongly. (28:29) Yes, that's how it is. (28:31) We are really (28:32) part of this happiness.
(28:34) It is built on the fact that we really (28:36) have a society that is so-called (28:38) high-trust society. (28:40) Which means that (28:41) the people living in Finland (28:44) don't just trust (28:45) each other (28:49) but also (28:50) our institutions, which (28:52) the officials also have. (28:54) But it has not (28:55) happened by chance (28:57) in the sense that (28:59) it requires (29:01) a variety of (29:04) regulation (29:05) and supervision (29:07) and participation of the (29:08) international community (29:09) and the so-called (29:12) third power, (29:15) the media, (29:17) which then (29:18) as a guardian dog, (29:19) as we are here now, (29:21) I myself count this (29:23) discussion of ours (29:24) as an action (29:25) that does not necessarily (29:28) belong to the mainstream.
(29:31) We discuss these things (29:33) and so on. (29:36) In a certain way, (29:39) this whole (29:41) set of questions (29:44) and it really is (29:45) so that it is (29:47) difficult to find another place (29:48) in the world where there would be (29:51) such a trustworthy level of (29:52) official activity as above. (29:55) It is, of course, briefly (29:56) here to state that now (29:58) there is no question
####################

Title: Re: EU on CSAM: "Big Brother is watching you" (Peter Sund)
Post by: AribertDeckers on July 13, 2026, 04:33:34 AM

13.7.2026

Part 2

2 FINLAND CHAT CONTROL 2024 oj8Kj8oXfS4zMgVP

(29:31) We discuss these things (29:33) and so on. (29:36) In a certain way, (29:39) this whole (29:41) set of questions (29:44) and it really is (29:45) so that it is (29:47) difficult to find another place (29:48) in the world where there would be (29:51) such a trustworthy level of (29:52) official activity as above. (29:55)

It is, of course, briefly (29:56) here to state that now (29:58) there is no question

------

(0:02) ...and so-called third power, that is, the media, which as a watchdog, as we are here now, I at least myself (0:12) I'm going to count this discussion of ours to the media as an action that necessarily belongs to the mainstream. (0:21) that we discuss these issues and so on. (0:27) That's what it's all about, in a certain way, this whole issue.

(0:34) And it really is like this, that it is difficult to find another place in the world where there would be such a reliable level of official activity. (0:45) It is, of course, briefly here to say that now it is not a question of Finland, but now it is a question of the 27 states. (0:54) And there is not much to be thrown at with a stone, so we come to such a state as Hungary, (0:59) which has come here in recent years, or in the past decade, (1:07) as a sad result of these authoritarian ambitions and corruption and many other things.
(1:17) And it feels particularly bad because when the whole of the European Union is built on the basis of common values, (1:25) which we should share. (1:28) There is a good example that this system of ours will not last if we do not take care of it. (1:36) So how would this actually go, that if this CSM legislation or bill went through, (1:44) then at what all levels would there be an opportunity to monitor the media of Finns? (1:51) Well, the mechanism that has been proposed for it would be a kind of debt-automated mechanism, (2:05) in which the system would automatically collect the contents of the so-called red flag.
(2:22) The bill has been limited in such a way that in the latest version it would only cover the pictorial message. (2:34) This may not be the case at all, because there are also hyperlinks in the bill, (2:42) i.e. a kind of text content that leads to some website, so they should also be monitored. (2:49) But all in all, it would be monitored with such an automated system.
(2:57) And then when these hits, i.e. what is considered to be a suspicious substance, (3:13) a kind of forbidden substance, they would be directed to be checked. (3:19) And this process is of course such that most of all this data and understanding (3:31) of what is going on in the messaging services and what kind it is, (3:41) it ends up with these service providers, (3:44) of which, of course, the most central and largest are foreign companies in Europe. (3:52) And then after that, the next gathering point would be the EU-authorized monitoring center, (4:04) i.e. the network-related child sexual abuse monitoring center.
(4:08) And thirdly, it would then become the law enforcement authority of the United States, (4:14) i.e. in Finland it would be the police. (4:17) But still, the monitoring of Finnish media is something that is outside of Finland. (4:25) Yes.
(4:27) Because I think that's a very basic question that really needs to be thought about quite a lot, (4:32) is that the kind of world we would like to go to? (4:36) And then what came to mind, that just when you said that now at least in the beginning (4:43) there would be mostly those images and then also these hyperlinks or links, (4:48) but that you can just think about whether you want to live in such a world (4:53) that if you send some intimate, individual images with your partner, (4:58) then they would then be checked somewhere by the EU-authorized monitoring. (5:04) Yes, in practice, it would have to be done. (5:07) Because a couple of things are probably good to take into account in this matter.
(5:14) One is that it may be that many do not quite know the scale of this e-mail. (5:23) And it is such that worldwide at least 260 billion messages are sent every day. (5:34) That is the daily number.
(5:37) And that means that if we think that, for example, the European Union, (5:43) which is a technologically developed area, (5:46) that quite a lot of e-mails are sent here, (5:51) and of course the volume of e-mails is also the largest in the world. (6:00) Then 10% of this total message would still mean 26 billion daily messages. (6:13) And in that sense, we would already be at the monthly level (6:28) in quite considerable amounts.
(6:33) I don't know if it's worth counting it now, (6:38) whether it's a day or a month or a year or whatever. (6:41) But if we think in such a way that there are 26 billion messages daily, (6:53) that is such a huge amount, (6:56) that even a small fraction of them would end up as a monitoring target. (7:08) For example, a percentage would still be 26 billion messages a day.
(7:17) In a month, if the monitoring was carried out for one month, (7:21) it would be almost double the total number of messages sent by the European Union. (7:29) So the scale is quite massive. (7:33) And maybe another thing related to that, (7:37) as I said there are two things, (7:41) is the number of messages.
(7:45) And then there's the fact that these automated recognition technologies are quite extensive. (7:57) Of course, it depends on what perspective we're looking at, (8:02) in what all ways they arise. (8:05) But even if we look at it from several different angles, (8:09) or precisely when we look at it from different angles, (8:11) we can be quite sure that these go wrong in both directions.
(8:21) That is, there will be such recognition situations (8:24) where content that is not prohibited by law ends up as a monitoring target. (8:31) And then again, content that is prohibited by law, (8:37) it does not end up as a monitoring target. (8:39) I remember reading about a case like this, (8:42) and now I'm interested to know if you've come across the same, (8:45) but that a person would now remember (8:48) in which country, probably in the United States, (8:50) but that he would have sent a picture of a sick child to his own doctor, (8:55) of some kind of skin disease.
(8:57) And then this was somehow automatically recognized as inappropriate material, (9:03) or something like that. (9:04) And then now I don't remember if I followed this person (9:07) how many problems or how this case went, (9:10) but does this sound the same? (9:13) Yes, it sounds. I've heard of that case.
(9:15) It holds true in the sense that (9:19) they have probably happened a lot more, (9:22) because there is just the automation at the bottom. (9:25) But the fact that one such case has ended up as a discussion topic, (9:30) there are probably many coincidences. (9:34) I believe that there are a crazy number (9:38) where there have been similar cases, (9:40) but they have just ended up in the public.
(9:43) And there was actually a question (9:48) that somehow the wrong content was automatically recognized (9:53) as a violation of the rules. (9:55) In this case, not necessarily against the law, (9:57) but for example, against the user of the messaging service, (10:04) although the background of those uses is precisely that (10:08) we are trying to prevent content that is forbidden by law. (10:13) And the consequence would then be the closure of the space, (10:16) that the person lost the opportunity to use these (10:20) generally and widely used messaging services as a whole.
(10:27) Is that a good example in your opinion? (10:30) I don't know if it's a good right word, (10:32) but in any case an example of how flawed that technology is. (10:37) And then, if you think that such mass surveillance (10:41) would be practiced by the authorities, (10:44) what would be the risk that just ordinary people (10:48) could then end up as a suspect in such a child (10:52) of transmitting inappropriate material, (10:55) even though they really have not been accused of anything? (10:57) Yes, it is at least usable (11:05) or observable as an example. (11:07) Maybe I'd rather use this word, (11:11) because there is a question of this wrong decision-making.
(11:18) And it has to do with the fact that (11:21) when there are such mathematical algorithms (11:24) that calculate those kind of detections, (11:27) a bit like digital fingerprints or something like that, (11:30) for example, from a photographic material, (11:33) it can be, of course, anything good, (11:35) it can be, for example, a certain word, (11:38) so it can also be calculated in the opposite way (11:41) with such an algorithm, such a detector. (11:44) And these detectors would then be used for comparison. (11:49) And at a very high level of reliability, (11:56) existing technologies do not really exist.
(12:02) Of course, in controlled situations, (12:06) they have been able to produce quite well, (12:08) but in real life, (12:11) they have been very difficult to interpret things wrongly. (12:15) For example, Apple, (12:17) which is still known, (12:19) perhaps in a technological sense, (12:23) as the world leader as a developer (12:27) and also as a protector of digital security. (12:33) Apple's services are very reliable.
(12:38) Apple has developed this kind of recognition technology (12:44) which could be used, (12:46) but gave up on it at the end, (12:49) because it simply could not work (12:52) when it was allowed to test the system (12:56) from the point of view of data security researchers. (13:02) The total misuse of the system was only within two weeks, (13:06) so it simply could not produce the desired result. (13:14) What do you think, (13:15) how much of Apple's decision to give up on the system (13:19) was also because of the fact that (13:22) a multi-potential customer, (13:26) the user of Apple products, (13:28) who would appreciate the uniqueness, (13:29) would no longer use Apple products (13:31) if they were built with this kind of service mechanism, (13:37) which would then break the uniqueness? (13:39) Well, it would probably be quite a natural consequence.
(13:45) Of course, part of the purpose of this bill (13:51) is to prevent public disclosure. (13:54) In a way, it has been the case that (13:56) if these major central functions (14:00) were forced into this kind of operation, (14:04) then users would no longer have many options. (14:07) In the same way as, for example, (14:10) the protection of other individuals.
(14:12) If we think of the general data protection system in Europe, (14:17) the so-called GDPR, (14:19) which came into force a few years ago, (14:23) or five years ago, (14:25) then there should have been a kind of monitoring (14:36) that users would run away from services (14:41) that use personal data for the wrong and questionable purposes. (14:52) But this did not happen, (14:54) because it would have required (14:56) that a sufficiently large group (14:59) would have had to do it at the same time. (15:04) We adults, who probably think more of Facebook, (15:09) because we are probably some kind of boomers, (15:14) or whatever we are now called, (15:17) so when everyone else stayed there as users, (15:22) what does it help to be alone when you can't message (15:25) and participate in social media? (15:33) That's one aspect of it.
(15:36) But in terms of messaging services, (15:39) fortunately, there have been some changes today. (15:43) One good example of this is that (15:46) some of the already free messaging services (15:52) have been weak or weaker in terms of security, (15:57) or at least questionable. (16:02) So there is no certainty that you can trust them.
(16:05) So that has at least led to clear movement. (16:09) And one such direction has been that, (16:12) for example, the Signal application (16:16) has gotten quite a lot of users, (16:20) especially those who care about these things (16:24) or understand them a little better. (16:27) So it's a good example of these commonly known alternatives.
(16:35) And the popularity of Signal is based on (16:41) the fact that there are a lot of factors (16:44) that are considered to be good features and good practices (16:49) that make it possible to trust that it is really individual. (16:56) We also have, for example, (16:58) a whole European-wide network in use, (17:02) where the leaders of different organizations in information security (17:09) are changing their minds on very important issues (17:15) and things that may be, (17:18) at any given time, (17:22) in use and affect the whole of Europe's information security situation, for example. (17:30) So that is also operated in such a trusted environment.
(17:37) A couple of things still come to mind, (17:39) if we return to the CSM regulation. (17:41) What would happen in practice (17:44) if all of these service providers or application developers (17:48) didn't just take this information security component into their use? (17:54) Well, that would actually be certain, (17:58) because in this way it has been wanted, (18:05) or the extent of it is in practice (18:08) that we are trying to get these companies, (18:13) which are company-forming, (18:15) which provide services, (18:16) i.e. operate in the area of the European Union, (18:20) within the scope of this control effect. (18:24) But then we have other ways of doing things, (18:29) like, for example, (18:30) joint decisions based on the Open Source Code.
(18:34) Some talk about those fragmented systems, (18:38) or whatever, they never use any terms. (18:41) But the point is that, (18:45) if, for example, you and I (18:48) would like to create an application together, (18:51) it can be a game or a message application, (18:54) and we don't have any company (18:57) or any registered company behind it, (19:01) so it's quite difficult to create a project (19:09) how effective the control effects are. (19:14) So basically, what if, (19:18) let's think about Signal, (19:19) if Signal just didn't take that security component into their use, (19:24) and I could imagine that Signal probably wouldn't want anything to do with it, (19:27) would the EU try to prevent the use of Signal in the EU area? (19:35) And would it even be possible? (19:36) Yes, of course.
(19:38) This is, in a way, (19:41) just the kind of question that goes to the area (19:45) where we have to quickly realize (19:47) how difficult it is to quickly develop (19:52) flexible technology (19:57) by controlling the law. (20:01) In any case, it's difficult. (20:04) It requires a lot of knowledge, (20:06) deep understanding, (20:08) and how, in the end, (20:13) rules can be created that work, (20:16) how they can be monitored, (20:18) and how technologies work, (20:20) and so on.
(20:21) I'm quite skeptical that it could succeed in any way. (20:29) The comparison could be that, (20:32) if, for example, (20:35) the law enforcement is tightened, (20:36) as has been done in Finland (20:38) in the last decades, (20:41) quite well, quite fundamentally, (20:43) but the effect on unlawful weapons (20:48) is inevitable. (20:52) But, of course, (20:55) the difference is, perhaps, (20:57) that unlawful weapons (21:01) can't just be prepared in that way.
(21:06) Quite rarely do you find (21:08) equivalent gun enthusiasts (21:10) who would be able to prepare (21:11) complete dangerous firearms (21:13) in a group of friends. (21:17) But different applications, (21:20) applications, software, (21:23) that work on mobile phones (21:24) or even computers, (21:26) it actually succeeds with anyone. (21:29) Not just anyone, (21:31) but I want to say that (21:34) today's application development (21:37) is much closer to (21:44) assembling LEGOs.
(21:46) So, you don't need to light LEGO boxes (21:49) out of plastic anymore, (21:50) but you can take them from a post office (21:53) and load them on top of each other (21:56) and so on, (21:57) so that you get a usable whole, (22:02) for example a star of death, (22:04) or something that anyone wants to build. (22:06) One thing that came to mind (22:09) about equivalent weapons (22:11) is that, (22:13) in a way, (22:14) I think otherwise it's good, (22:16) but then you can think that (22:18) if there is no reason to use (22:20) a weapon in the wrong way, (22:22) then there is no reason (22:24) to get a legal weapon, (22:26) but you can get (22:26) completely legal and legal knowledge. (22:29) But then again, what comes to these (22:30) messaging applications, (22:33) I can imagine that many people, (22:35) even if they don't want to make (22:37) any legislation, (22:38) would still want to use (22:40) such applications, (22:41) which then return the uniqueness.
(22:43) Yes, definitely just like that, (22:46) and that is actually (22:47) perhaps the most central observation (22:49) of even these two examples (22:51) that I raised (22:53) comparatively, (22:56) because (22:56) in terms of firearms, (22:59) it's just like that, of course. (23:01) If, for example, you are interested in (23:03) hunting or something, (23:04) then you don't need (23:04) unlawful weapons. (23:07) But the use of these (23:08) messaging applications (23:10) and people wanting to use (23:12) those which a third party (23:15) cannot access, (23:16) it is and should be (23:19) in the interest of (23:23) precisely (23:24) according to the law (23:25) and ethically and otherwise (23:28) properly functioning, responsible (23:30) people should have such a goal.
(23:32) Because (23:35) trustworthiness (23:36) is such a thing that (23:38) on the other hand, there are precisely (23:40) malicious actors. (23:42) And as criminal as (23:45) the states (23:48) are trying, of course, (23:51) to misuse everything (23:52) possible from the digital (23:55) operating environment (23:56) to get rid of it. (23:57) So it is then for the purpose of crime (23:58) to misuse (24:02) or (24:04) finding such a message (24:07) that can be used to (24:08) incite someone to make (24:10) a mistake by giving (24:11) a bank account or some kind of (24:14) romance scam or some kind of (24:15) involvement.
(24:16) These are of course a huge number. (24:19) And then, of course, (24:20) surveillance. (24:21) And even then, as many (24:25) may think, that (24:26) this is not a movie-like (24:29) surveillance against me.
(24:30) But yes, it actually (24:32) affects, because it is also (24:34) very opportunistic and it is also (24:36) based on this kind of (24:38) knowledge (24:44) accumulation principle. (24:51) Actors who (24:52) operate (24:53) on that side of the fence (24:56) aim, of course, to (24:58) benefit from a large (25:00) amount of data and for example (25:02) understanding that if we take (25:03) our neighbor Russia, (25:06) then Russia's (25:08) aims, if it is intended to win (25:10) a war in Ukraine, (25:12) it is hugely beneficial (25:14) to be able to understand (25:15) who in Finland is, for example, and (25:17) in what way, an ally or (25:19) some kind of opinion (25:20) formation, so that we could (25:23) for example get a certain (25:25) kind of voting result in time (25:27) or other example, political (25:28) resistance. (25:31) For example, so that our (25:32) taxes are directed (25:34) to Ukraine's (25:37) defense aims and so on.
(25:40) That helps a lot (25:41) in these (25:43) Russian aims (25:43) that lead to killing people. (25:46) Is it possible (25:48) that if such a (25:50) surveillance component (25:51) would be required, or (25:53) the EU would require (25:55) mainly large companies to use (25:58) such a surveillance component, (26:00) if it is so that (26:01) an open source project cannot be (26:04) controlled, but anyway (26:06) if the EU would require (26:08) the use of such a surveillance component, (26:10) how risky (26:12) would this surveillance component (26:14) be for hackers (26:15) and so that some malicious intent (26:17) would get their hands on (26:19) that message? (26:20) Well, Rohkenen says (26:23) that it would be (26:26) a very big (26:27) interest, because (26:29) there is a question then (26:30) that, for example, (26:34) the vast majority, (26:35) let's say 98% (26:37) of all the (26:39) amount that some malicious (26:40) intent would like to get in time, (26:43) has already been (26:45) programmed and (26:47) implemented into the (26:48) messaging system. And the only thing (26:50) that the malicious intent would then have (26:52) to do, would be to get (26:54) that component to be used (26:56) in some other way than (26:58) how it is meant to work.
(27:01) For example, by adding (27:02) detectives there, who also (27:04) recognize something other than (27:05) what is legally forbidden, (27:08) or, for example, (27:11) to do something else, (27:12) or, for example, to cause (27:14) a huge amount of wrong (27:16) identification, so that (27:18) masses of people would end up (27:20) in some kind of suspicion (27:21) of a crime, or something like that. (27:24) Of course, there are so many (27:27) that it may not be worth (27:30) trying to read all of them, (27:32) but the information (27:34) is absolutely clear that it would (27:35) be, of course, huge. (27:37) And like in all programs, (27:40) there are (27:40) vulnerabilities everywhere, (27:44) and there would be (27:46) them in this kind of system.
(27:47) If I may sum it up somehow, (27:49) can I say that one vulnerability, (27:51) or one (27:53) point of interest for these (27:55) malicious intents would be (27:57) the monitoring component (27:59) in the program itself, (28:01) but at the same time (28:02) the official monitoring (28:05) center, if you think about (28:06) what is the (28:08) hub, or the (28:10) place where all (28:12) the information is obtained. (28:14) Yes, absolutely, (28:16) of course there would be, (28:18) and I would see (28:20) that there are still (28:22) those, like, (28:25) let's say, (28:27) more (28:30) risks (28:30) that relate to (28:34) that are present, (28:36) specifically those (28:38) child sexual abuse. (28:41) In the interest of those (28:42) who practice that activity, (28:44) it would also be wrong to use (28:46) this whole system.
(28:50) Like, for example, (28:51) if we think that there is (28:53) a secret database (28:56) where there is (28:58) information about (29:00) what all the contents are (29:02) for monitoring, (29:04) both the circulation (29:05) and the misuse (29:07) are of course (29:08) of great interest. (29:12) Actually, to the last (29:13) point you made, (29:15) would it be so that (29:16) that kind of database could (29:19) in some way also benefit (29:21) those people who initially (29:24) produce or distribute (29:25) materials related to (29:25) child sexual abuse? (29:29) Well, it would be (29:30) sad, yes, (29:33) because then (29:34) it would be a (29:36) comprehensive (29:39) of what kind of (29:40) content is in the (29:42) authorities' knowledge, (29:43) and what isn't. (29:45) Then the interest would be (29:48) specifically to know (29:51) what kind of content (29:52) can still be safely (29:55) used and distributed, (29:56) and of course this system (29:58) does not
################

Title: Re: EU on CSAM: "Big Brother is watching you" (Peter Sund)
Post by: AribertDeckers on July 13, 2026, 04:47:27 AM

13.7.2026
Part 3

3 FINLAND CHAT CONTROL 2024 oj8Kj8oXfS4zMgVP

(0:00) It is important to have a well-known database, (0:04) in which there is information about all the contents (0:08) that are to be monitored. (0:11) Both the circulation and misuse (0:14) are of course of great interest. (0:19) So, to the last point you made, (0:22) is it possible that such a database (0:25) could in some way also benefit (0:28) those people who initially produce (0:31) or distribute materials related to the law to children? (0:35) Well, it would be sad, yes.
(0:40) Because then it is a comprehensive view (0:46) of what kind of law material is in the officials' knowledge (0:49) and what is not. (0:51) So then the interest would be directed (0:55) specifically to the knowledge (0:57) of what materials can be safely used and distributed. (1:03) And of course, this system would not allow (1:08) the production of new material.
(1:14) And now if we think about what is at the core (1:18) of our efforts to protect our children, (1:21) then it is of course the situation (1:26) in which a child or a young person ends up (1:30) as a target of misuse. (1:32) So that either he or she, this person, (1:36) is produced such material, (1:39) or that he or she, for example, (1:41) produces it voluntarily (1:42) and gives it to someone else. (1:45) And this is what we all would like to prevent (1:50) and this system does not allow it at all.
(1:55) Or it would not allow the lack of this. (1:58) So the question is, (2:00) that would it be so that the existing material (2:04) that we are trying to monitor, (2:06) or would try to monitor, (2:07) with the means that have been discussed here, (2:11) so when they know what that material is, (2:15) would it encourage them to create more of it in advance? (2:18) And that at least scares itself, (2:24) even just asking that question. (2:27) Yes, that is exactly what one could imagine (2:31) that politicians should think about.
(2:34) Well, now if we still think about corruption (2:39) and how these existing systems (2:42) can be misused by the authorities themselves, (2:45) which we talked about earlier, (2:47) that in Finland we live in this (2:49) society of high trust, (2:51) but everyone knows the case of Jari Aarnio. (2:56) So how big a risk in your opinion would it be (2:59) that if such a big brother-in-law (3:02) machine factory would be built, (3:06) it would also allow the misuse (3:08) of purely private property? (3:11) Well, yes. (3:15) This is such a thing that (3:17) it is a shame to have to or end up (3:26) discussing such things.
(3:28) Jari Aarnio's murder, of course, (3:30) in his own class, (3:33) although it does tell (3:36) quite a strong story that (3:38) the fact that a person practices (3:42) some profession, (3:43) it does not make a person immune (3:45) to making some wrong (3:47) and very harmful decisions. (3:55) But I would raise the issue (3:57) in such a way that (3:59) the greater concern is not necessarily (4:02) that we would have a single Jari Aarnio (4:05) who would misuse such a system, (4:09) but rather that (4:12) both the attraction to existing (4:17) abilities and abilities (4:19) gradually, so to speak, (4:26) reduces the boundaries. (4:29) And then, on the other hand, (4:33) such a good-natured, (4:35) as you mentioned in the beginning, (4:38) a good-natured (4:41) flat surface that (4:43) leads us to the wrong place (4:47) and to the path of horrors.
(4:49) And it is precisely, (4:51) there are good examples of this, (4:54) for example, if we take (4:56) the latest publications in the (4:58) press, (5:01) we have, for example, (5:04) several criminal investigations, (5:08) suspicions, for example, (5:09) about the protection of the police, (5:12) which many probably think (5:14) that it is a trustworthy group. (5:17) In principle and for a long time (5:19) this is the case, but it does not mean (5:21) that everything would always be (5:24) according to the law, (5:27) that there would always be (5:28) similar observations about the (5:30) especially all of it, (5:31) the most trustworthy, (5:32) that is, we go very far (5:34) into the individuality of people (5:37) without having any reason (5:38) to suspect a crime yet. (5:41) We can take examples, for example, (5:45) that on what basis in Finland (5:47) has, for example, been suspected (5:48) of a registered crime.
(5:52) We have had in Finland (5:53) a kind of action culture, (5:54) that if the law gives (5:57) a visible possibility, (6:00) for example, with one criterion, (6:02) that the suspicion of a crime is (6:04) for example more than a (6:06) fraud or something like that, (6:08) which is easily understood, (6:09) that if you can get a prison (6:11) somewhere, then always (6:14) a person is registered. (6:17) But the thing is not really (6:19) that simple, (6:20) but these have still been (6:22) practiced in Finland for a long time, (6:24) and now it has come up again (6:26) in a certain way, (6:29) when judges have had to (6:31) then study (6:32) whether this is really (6:33) according to the law. (6:35) Or, for example, (6:38) people's mobile devices (6:41) even when the crime itself, (6:45) for example, (6:46) some kind of crime (6:47) has been committed, (6:49) even in a police station, (6:50) a glass wall or something, (6:53) it may have been (6:55) some time ago (6:57) even more understandable (7:00) to look through the phone (7:02) when there was nothing (7:04) but a phone call, (7:06) a few text messages (7:08) and then (7:09) the friends' address.
(7:11) But nowadays our whole life (7:13) in these mobile devices, (7:14) even the most (7:16) simple things (7:18) are found (7:20) behind the glass screen. (7:26) Do we need and want (7:28) this kind of thing (7:31) when the (7:33) reason (7:34) why these should work (7:36) has not been in reality. (7:39) Well, what if (7:40) you still think a little (7:42) about such a similar (7:44) surface, is one of (7:46) your concerns that (7:48) if this kind of (7:50) system is built, (7:51) or maybe (7:53) a little refer to it, (7:55) what other things can be added (7:58) to it, that it starts (8:00) from the fact that (8:01) only this kind of law (8:04) related material is forbidden.
(8:05) But when such a system has been created, (8:07) then you can add (8:09) something else at once. (8:11) Well, actually (8:12) we could forbid this, we could (8:14) forbid that, and then it could happen (8:16) that at some point (8:19) the text content (8:20) ends up being (8:22) forbidden, where the (8:25) whole system is criticized. (8:27) Is it somehow (8:28) that the system (8:31) itself is more of a concern (8:33) than the single (8:35) thing that the system (8:38) tries to do at first? (8:40) Yes, (8:41) maybe you could (8:43) say so.
(8:47) The fact that (8:49) a large part of (8:50) people think (8:51) that when we have (8:52) socially agreed social (8:54) rules, which are (8:56) of course shaped by many laws, (8:59) but one of the middle ones (9:00) is, for example, what is criminal (9:02) and what is not. These crimes (9:05) are typically (9:07) actions (9:09) that are (9:11) very harmful (9:13) to other members of society (9:15) and because of that (9:17) they (9:20) are (9:21) forbidden, (9:23) so there is (9:24) criminal prosecution and so on. (9:28) So (9:29) from (9:31) this starting point (9:35) many (9:36) experience, and (9:37) should experience, that it is important (9:38) that there are (9:42) some consequences (9:44) And so on.
(9:46) But (9:48) where this discussion, (9:51) this thought and these (9:52) opinions are formed, (9:54) the larger part (9:56) is actually (9:59) one in which (10:00) one should ask (10:02) where is the (10:04) appropriate balance (10:06) between supervision (10:08) and freedom. (10:12) And (10:14) if we (10:15) want all (10:16) people, all (10:18) people to always (10:20) stick to everything (10:22) then we don't have (10:25) any other option in society (10:26) than to build a total (10:28) surveillance (10:31) society. (10:32) And they are not, (10:34) even in history, (10:35) they are not really (10:38) both, they have not been (10:40) sustainable, they have ruined (10:42) the society, and they have (10:44) also led to a lot (10:45) of pretty terrible (10:48) life in the end.
(10:50) If we think of any (10:53) dictatorial (10:55) totalitarian (10:57) society (10:58) and (10:58) so on, because (11:01) societies still live in time and they change (11:03) and so on, (11:05) there is really (11:06) a background thought (11:09) that such a 100% (11:10) cover should not be (11:13) thought of. (11:14) And now, if we make (11:16) this information system (11:18) familiar to many other (11:20) processes of development, (11:22) then we can talk about (11:23) the idea of (11:23) partial optimization, (11:25) that we develop (11:26) a whole (11:27) in its individual (11:32) parts or (11:33) components. (11:35) And that slippery surface (11:36) is due to the fact that (11:38) if we build (11:39) a capacity for (11:42) what technically (11:43) enables expansion, (11:45) the attraction is (11:47) huge.
(11:49) If we think that (11:51) child protection (11:53) is an important goal (11:54) for all healthy people, (11:57) but where (11:59) are those people who say (12:01) that if child (12:03) protection is important, (12:06) then what about (12:07) terrorism? (12:09) Isn't it quite important? (12:11) Well, it is important. (12:12) And then we ask, (12:14) what about economic crimes? (12:16) Economic crimes still take (12:18) quite a lot of power (12:20) out of society. (12:21) Well, that's also important.
(12:24) And what about (12:25) the next and the next (12:27) and the next (12:29) that are never (12:32) criminal types, (12:33) then ultimately our own (12:35) assessment is that it would lead (12:37) precisely to the fact that (12:39) we are in a (12:41) comprehensive (12:43) message monitoring (12:45) sooner or later. (12:46) And then you can think why (12:48) leave it only to message monitoring, (12:50) why not build (12:52) China-style monitoring (12:54) on all sides and then (12:56) automatic recognition of growth and so on. (12:59) In a certain way, (13:01) maybe in many (13:02) cases, such a slippery surface (13:04) argument is not necessarily (13:06) so good or sustainable.
(13:08) The fact that one step is taken (13:09) does not automatically mean that (13:12) it would lead to something worse. (13:14) But I think this is an issue (13:15) and this is just purely my subjective (13:18) or personal opinion and (13:19) this may be completely different. (13:21) But if we look at what has (13:24) happened in the world, (13:24) when such monitoring systems (13:27) have been built, (13:29) where has it historically led? (13:32) I think it's worth thinking about (13:34) it quite (13:36) seriously.
(13:37) And then one thing that (13:41) I would like to say (13:43) to everyone who (13:44) thinks that (13:46) this is not leading (13:48) to anything bad. (13:49) We may already have some individual (13:51) nuts and bolts in the network man's (13:53) group, but now we have to (13:56) be able to trust current (13:57) politicians. Then think about it (13:59) like, okay, (14:00) what if (14:03) 20 years later (14:05) our politicians (14:06) would be a little different? (14:08) Imagine in your mind the most (14:10) unlikable political (14:12) side or direction, just the same (14:14) as it is now at some point, but (14:16) think about what your own in-hoc is (14:18) and think that the (14:20) in-hoc side is the one (14:22) who is in power 20 years later (14:24) and gets to name the network (14:26) men and gets to control (14:28) what all the other things (14:30) are added to the monitoring list.
(14:33) Yeah, that's (14:34) a good and (14:37) important idea. (14:38) I would even make (14:40) such bold assumptions that you don't (14:42) necessarily need to wait 20 years (14:44) when it may be that three (14:46) years is enough. (14:48) Namely, when we have a political (14:50) system in Finland, (14:52) naturally, for four years, (14:54) it is quite possible (14:57) that it will happen in that cycle.
(15:00) And as it has actually (15:01) happened. If we think about (15:03) a little over a year ago or (15:04) a year and a half ago when we had the last elections, (15:07) then we (15:10) now had a clear (15:11) change of (15:12) the focus. (15:15) So we went (15:16) like, I don't want to (15:19) say lazy, but let's say that (15:20) from the other side, like the Vaakakuppi (15:23) changed in this big picture.
(15:25) And (15:27) not only that, but (15:30) now if we (15:31) when you talk about (15:34) we are lucky (15:37) here in Finland, (15:38) for example, (15:40) in terms of this (15:42) legislation, (15:44) that maybe like (15:45) some others, (15:48) we, for example, (15:50) the parliament has been very interested (15:53) and wanted to understand (15:56) things (15:57) from a deeper level. (15:59) Not necessarily. (16:00) This has not been the case in all (16:02) other EU member states.
(16:04) Because if we look, for example, (16:06) at the number of states that support (16:08) this proposal, it is (16:10) quite large and there are (16:12) states from which we would not have (16:14) initially believed. (16:15) How can it be possible (16:18) that they have decided that (16:19) this kind of system (16:21) is a good idea. (16:23) But luckily for us (16:25) it has been the other way around and (16:26) even now, at the best of times, (16:29) this legislation is in the (16:29) hands of the parliament.
(16:34) And (16:37) there is (16:39) some, yes, like (16:40) for example, (16:43) in parliamentary work (16:44) there are clear (16:47) observations that we have (16:49) the desire and ability in the (16:50) political decision-making center (16:51) to make long-term (16:55) wise (16:57) decisions in (16:58) the face of such questions, (17:00) where we have to, (17:01) in a situation where we have (17:04) important values, (17:06) which have to be weighed, (17:08) that which goes (17:09) forward, or which is (17:12) heavier than the other. (17:13) And this is (17:15) very, very important. (17:18) It is (17:20) very encouraging.
(17:21) Fortunately, there are other (17:23) EU member states (17:26) that use very (17:28) careful consideration (17:29) of this and other (17:32) things. But yes, (17:33) I would still say (17:35) to your (17:37) thought that (17:39) it is certain (17:42) that (17:45) times and (17:46) political winds (17:47) change, (17:50) let's say, (17:52) faster than the air, (17:54) maybe a little slower than the weather, (17:56) but not much (17:57) difference. (17:59) I would say that probably (18:01) faster than slower.
(18:04) Yes. (18:05) Well, what if (18:08) your association's (18:10) clearly critical of this (18:11) bill, and I can say that (18:13) in the name of openness, (18:14) I also relate to this very (18:17) critically, which probably (18:18) has also been seen in some (18:19) of my own questions. (18:24) But I also understand (18:25) those who then (18:27) say that, well, (18:29) okay, now this kind of law (18:31) is not, or if they think (18:33) that this kind of law should not be done, (18:35) then it is not the original problem.
(18:36) But if you think about (18:39) child sexual abuse, (18:40) especially its material (18:42) spread on the web, that it does not (18:44) disappear anywhere, then is (18:46) there again some (18:49) solutions (18:50) that would (18:52) go together (18:54) with this privacy, how (18:56) then those problems could be (18:57) solved more efficiently today? (19:00) Yes, I will answer (19:03) briefly to the end of your (19:06) question, and we can (19:07) talk about them in a moment. (19:09) I would like to take (19:12) at least a couple of things (19:14) before that. (19:15) One is that it is (19:17) true that we relate very (19:20) critically (19:22) to our response, (19:23) so to speak, to (19:28) general (19:31) suspicion of (19:33) baseless (19:34) mass surveillance (19:37) solutions (19:37) and proposals, as (19:40) usually, because our intention (19:42) through our members (19:44) is ultimately (19:46) to support (19:48) and be involved in developing (19:50) a better digital (19:53) life.
Our digital (19:54) life is not as (19:56) high quality as our (19:57) real (20:00) hands-on world, (20:03) so our (20:04) rights are not fulfilled (20:05) at the level (20:07) that we (20:10) are used to (20:13) Before that, there is still (20:15) a lot of work to be done. (20:17) Actually, one question in between, (20:18) when you just said the term mass surveillance, (20:21) is this (20:22) the core of (20:23) your criticism or (20:26) is it just one part of them? (20:29) But specifically the idea that (20:30) a system should be built (20:33) that would (20:34) start monitoring people (20:36) without any (20:38) suspicion. Is that (20:40) the basic principle? (20:42) Well, (20:46) in this regard, (20:47) I would like to talk about (20:48) a layer-hamburger, (20:50) so it has more than (20:52) one principle.
(20:53) I don't know (20:55) how many (20:57) layers there are (20:59) and how much attention (21:01) they require. (21:03) Other layers may be thicker than (21:05) others, but (21:07) mass surveillance is definitely (21:08) one of these layers. (21:12) The other (21:13) which actually (21:15) is part of it (21:17) is (21:18) when (21:21) in a (21:22) Finland-like (21:24) free democratic (21:27) society, (21:29) the aim of (21:29) mass surveillance (21:33) is to get (21:34) away from the (21:36) suspicion of crime.
(21:39) Not in the way (21:40) that we think (21:42) that everyone is monitored (21:44) at the same intensity (21:45) all the time, (21:47) but the people's (21:49) own choices and actions (21:51) will be (21:51) the indicators (21:55) of who is (21:57) targeted (21:59) by the authorities. (22:01) And this is (22:05) perhaps the thicker (22:07) part of this layer. (22:09) And because this legislation (22:10) does not really allow (22:12) in the proposed form (22:14) to provide this kind of possibility.
(22:16) But then there are (22:18) other layers, one of which (22:20) is, for example, (22:23) any (22:26) type of (22:27) official control. (22:28) If we assumed (22:29) that we had a way (22:32) to act in which (22:34) surveillance could be (22:38) to those people, (22:40) to those groups who are (22:42) suspected of (22:43) practicing (22:45) child sexual abuse (22:48) or its related (22:50) material abuse. (22:52) So enjoy this (22:53) material.
(22:54) Even then (22:59) mechanisms that (23:01) legislation (23:04) produces, (23:05) they must be (23:08) predictable (23:10) So in no way (23:11) should such legislation (23:15) be created (23:16) if we don't know what happens (23:18) when it starts to be applied. (23:21) And that's (23:21) the second layer (23:24) here. (23:26) The third (23:27) layer is perhaps (23:29) even bigger in the sense (23:33) that (23:34) it's not just (23:35) a mass surveillance (23:37) perspective, but it's (23:39) that we have (23:42) a well-functioning (23:44) already now (23:44) I could say perhaps hundreds (23:46) of years (23:48) developed human and basic (23:50) rights system.
(23:52) So a kind of model of what values (23:54) are the most important (23:56) that must be protected (24:00) So (24:02) the whole must be (24:05) protected (24:05) from all the (24:08) good thoughts (24:11) And (24:12) that's because (24:14) for example (24:15) economic activity (24:18) is also based very broadly (24:20) on (24:22) trust. (24:24) And life (24:26) is based on trust (24:27) message exchange. (24:31) Some (24:33) secrets are more important than others (24:35) Let's talk about company secrets (24:36) or something like that.
(24:38) But daily (24:39) different kind of interactions (24:42) and interaction that we have (24:44) they don't belong to three parties (24:46) they don't belong to competitors (24:47) and they don't belong (24:49) to anyone. (24:52) The things that belong are told (24:54) on websites and news (24:57) and (24:59) in social media (25:00) and in messages (25:02) and so on. (25:03) It also comes to my mind that (25:05) if there was some kind of (25:07) surveillance agency (25:08) which in practice (25:11) would have access to all (25:13) possible company secrets (25:15) and even if (25:16) at first the system (25:18) wouldn't be built (25:19) so that it would read (25:21) every single message (25:23) but if the system is built (25:25) as mentioned earlier (25:27) it's easy to add things to it.
(25:29) If there was some kind of agency (25:31) which would have access (25:33) to all company secrets (25:35) then (25:35) I could say that (25:38) it would probably increase the risk of corruption (25:41) quite a lot because (25:43) the agency (25:44) which would have access to it (25:46) surely would have (25:48) quite a lot of (25:49) money or cash providers. (25:51) Quite a lot. (25:53) So if you think about (25:54) what are the ways (25:56) to reduce corruption (25:57) it's to build systems (26:01) where officials also (26:04) can't operate (26:05) in the wrong way.
(26:06) Even if there's always a possibility (26:07) for certain misuses (26:08) you can build systems (26:11) where the misuses (26:12) wouldn't be that big. (26:16) Yes, definitely. (26:17) And (26:19) if I think about (26:21) your original question a bit more (26:23) then (26:26) it's not (26:27) even only (26:29) about us (26:30) even though we are quite (26:32) visible in this matter (26:35) precisely for that reason (26:36) because our agency (26:39) is the one which produces (26:41) the elements of security (26:46) for other agencies (26:47) to see how (26:47) we can trust (26:48) digital systems (26:51) and data systems.
(26:55) But (26:56) we are (26:58) as an agency (26:59) one of the operators (27:00) of the technology industry (27:02) and the technology industry (27:05) is the biggest (27:09) agency in Finland (27:10) in the sense that (27:11) if we think about (27:13) the Finnish business sector (27:16) more than half (27:17) of our (27:20) revenue (27:22) comes from (27:23) the technology industry (27:25) companies in Finland (27:26) and about one third (27:29) comes from gross national product. (27:31) So our entire (27:32) economic well-being (27:34) has been built for a very long time (27:36) for this purpose. (27:37) In addition to that (27:41) our other operators (27:42) for example (27:45) TV and (27:46) telecommunications (27:47) network operators (27:49) and other operators (27:51) understand quite well (27:52) that digital communication (27:55) is everyday (27:56) they understand the risks (27:57) and dangers (27:58) of it.
(28:00) Of course there are (28:01) many other operators (28:02) that I wouldn't be (28:04) alone in this matter. (28:07) But (28:07) if I go to (28:10) the question (28:12) what would help? (28:16) If we think (28:18) that if this kind of regulation (28:20) doesn't go through (28:21) what could be the (28:24) current or (28:26) easily developed (28:28) solutions that could be used? (28:30) Yes. (28:33) There are (28:34) maybe two aspects that I would like (28:36) to highlight.
One is that (28:38) what this legislation (28:40) as a whole (28:42) contains. There are (28:44) actually quite a lot of (28:46) elements that are (28:48) very profitable (28:50) and those (28:52) that are already being (28:53) kept in advance. So now when I (28:55) talked about the follow-up (28:57) we know that (28:59) these actions would (29:02) have a positive effect (29:03) on our problem (29:05) that we are solving here.
(29:07) So we are not in any way (29:08) against this whole (29:10) legislation but (29:13) only those (29:15) very (29:17) harmful and (29:18) dangerous (29:22) elements (29:23) that it (29:25) contains. (29:27) Which are, for example, (29:29) the whole of (29:29) the forward monitoring. (29:34) And (29:35) the other thing is that (29:36) outside of this (29:39) legislation there are (29:40) of course also a lot of actions that (29:42) could be done.
(29:44) Which of course in this way (29:46) it progresses anyway (29:48) so there will be (29:51) no change but (29:52) those should be (29:53) progressed in some other way.
#########################

Title: Re: EU on CSAM: "Big Brother is watching you" (Peter Sund)
Post by: AribertDeckers on July 13, 2026, 08:59:13 AM

13.7.2026
Part 4

4 FINLAND CHAT CONTROL 2024 oj8Kj8oXfS4zMgVP

(0:00) There are actually quite a lot of elements that are well worth mentioning. (0:07) And those that are already being left in advance. (0:11) So now that I'm talking about the anticipation of the follow-up, (0:15) we know that these actions would have a positive effect on our problem that we are solving here.
(0:23) So we are not in any way against this entire proposal, (0:29) but only those very harmful and dangerous elements that it contains. (0:43) Which are, for example, this front-end monitoring package. (0:51) And the other thing is that outside of this proposed law, there are of course a lot of actions that could be done.
(1:01) Which of course, in this way, it progresses in any way, (1:06) so there will be no change, but they should then be advanced in some other way. (1:13) Can you give some examples of the proposed law, for example, (1:16) about the things that could be done? (1:18) Yes, yes, and we have actually provided them very extensively. (1:22) Also, for example, for those who are responsible for the preparation of this law.
(1:28) We have been involved from the very beginning, (1:30) when the European Commission has already started to prepare this, (1:35) and then also at the stage of the European Parliament. (1:38) And now at the stage of the hand-held states. (1:42) And so on, that they have been provided.
(1:46) And partly, in fact, it has been quite a good response, (1:50) but many times in legislation, accuracy and accuracy are a very central issue. (1:58) And one thing that we have found very commendable is that (2:03) we could rather write into the law, for example, (2:08) the design principles of such media systems. (2:13) What things must be above all, when these products are provided.
(2:20) What kinds of things should be there. (2:23) For example, the easy and fast reporting possibilities (2:33) specifically for maintaining these services. (2:36) A bit the same way as in many, for example, (2:39) services that can be used through a web browser.
(2:43) You can report it, if you notice something, (2:48) that wait a minute, this is inappropriate. (2:51) Or even on social media platforms, (2:53) you can typically report some inappropriate content. (2:56) But would those be the kind of things that would be written into the law, (3:01) that would then require these applications, or what do you mean by that? (3:07) Yes, exactly that.
(3:08) And then maybe even more centrally, (3:10) now that we're talking about how to treat children. (3:13) Because this kind of functionality fits into any kind of content that is, (3:19) if the user notices that someone is trying to cheat, (3:22) or something like that, (3:25) even such fraud crimes involving cheating (3:29) and stealing money from people in one way or another, (3:37) then these kinds of mechanisms also fit into that. (3:41) But then there are these child-friendly design principles as well, (3:46) which relate to the fact that there are technical implementation ways, (3:49) for example, to make it easy for parents to monitor, (3:54) i.e. the ability to monitor, (3:57) and safe basic settings, (4:01) such as, for example, (4:03) that no one can send messages to anyone in the service.
(4:13) And then, for example, age limits are monitored in such a way (4:16) that, for example, an adult cannot approach a child (4:20) if there is no mutual contact or these kinds of features. (4:26) Of course, it depends on the features of the messaging service, (4:31) which ones are the best. (4:33) But then there is, for example, (4:35) what is already under development in Europe, (4:37) the use of digital identity, (4:41) which is still being implemented, (4:44) it's going to roll out this year.
(4:47) And the basis for that is that (4:49) the European people, all people, (4:52) will have a fundamental right to maintain, (4:56) and the state actually offers such tools (5:01) so that we can maintain this kind of digital identity. (5:04) And the central functionality in that is (5:07) that people's identification, (5:13) i.e. some of the features that we have, (5:15) we don't do it anymore the way we used to. (5:19) If we think that, for example, (5:21) if you wanted to buy tobacco or alcohol (5:23) or some kind of age-restricted product from the store, (5:27) in the old days we showed (5:29) personal identification as a whole.
(5:32) It has the whole name, (5:34) it has the date of birth, (5:36) it has personal identification, (5:37) it has all kinds of information. (5:39) So, through these new digital identities, (5:42) we can even show that (5:43) I'm a certain age. (5:46) So, I've turned 15 or 18 years old, (5:49) or whatever it is, (5:50) without having to show to the service provider (5:53) my exact date of birth, for example.
(5:56) On the other hand, the basic thing (5:58) that we talked about earlier, (6:00) that not all software developers (6:03) would necessarily take them into account. (6:04) Or still, anyone can make their own application. (6:07) Some of the applications are not for the company, (6:10) but for some company's superiors.
(6:12) So, how would that work in practice? (6:16) Would that be aimed (6:17) only at the big companies? (6:21) Because a law that somehow (6:24) obliges all media applications (6:27) to work in a certain way, (6:29) that would seem (6:29) a bit strange in the same way. (6:31) Yeah, you're absolutely right. (6:34) The thing is, (6:36) we have proposed, (6:37) we have a fairly long list, (6:39) actually, there are 10 different (6:43) proposals, (6:44) which are good and affordable, (6:46) most of which is possible (6:48) with this law, (6:49) or with the law in force (6:52) that runs alongside it.
(6:53) We'll get to that sooner or later, (6:56) but then there are, of course, (6:57) these others as well. (6:58) But all in all, (7:00) there are things (7:02) that should be done (7:03) with this problem-solving, (7:05) in a way that, (7:08) as a politician, (7:11) probably many of you know well, (7:12) but without mentioning his name, (7:14) he said that the same lipstick (7:15) doesn't fit a melon and a lemon. (7:19) So, (7:20) the point was (7:21) that certain services (7:24) fit certain new methods (7:27) better, (7:28) and certain requirements, (7:29) and to others, (7:30) again, some others.
(7:31) So, for example, (7:32) what I just mentioned, (7:33) these typically fit (7:35) perhaps the bigger ones. (7:39) Then again, for example, (7:41) if we go back, (7:43) in that sense, (7:44) quickly to the beginning, (7:45) when I mentioned that we have two (7:48) areas in this problem-solving. (7:51) The second is the inappropriate approaches, (7:53) and the second is the material production.
(7:57) Because when the material (7:59) is already there, (8:00) it is a means of exchange. (8:02) It's like a commodity, (8:05) even if it's not necessarily (8:08) a euro or a dollar, (8:10) whatever it may be. (8:11) It's like, for example, (8:12) this kind of (8:13) plastic,
######################

Title: Re: EU on CSAM: "Big Brother is watching you" (Peter Sund)
Post by: AribertDeckers on July 14, 2026, 08:14:06 AM

14.7.2026
Part 5

5 FINLAND CHAT CONTROL 2024 oj8Kj8oXfS4zMgVP

(0:00) There are some strong assumptions that you don't necessarily need to wait 20 years, (0:04) because it may be that three years is enough. (0:08) Because in Finland, the political system creates a gap of four years, (0:14) so it is quite possible that it will happen in that cycle. (0:19) And it has actually happened.
(0:21) If we think a little over a year ago, or a year and a half ago when we had the last elections, (0:28) we had a clear change of focus. (0:35) So we went, I don't want to say from the side, (0:39) but let's say that from the other side, the scale has changed in this big picture. (0:46) And not only that, but now if we talk about politicians, (0:55) fortunately here in Finland, for example, in terms of this legislation, (1:03) or maybe in some other way, (1:08) we, for example, have been very interested and wanted to understand things from a deeper perspective.
(1:18) This has not necessarily been the case in all other EU member states. (1:24) Because if we look at, for example, the number of states that support this proposal, (1:29) it is quite large, and there are also states from which we would not have initially believed. (1:35) How can it be possible that they have decided that this kind of system is a good idea.
(1:43) But fortunately for us it has been the other way around, (1:46) and even now, at the best of times, this legislation is in the hands of the parliament. (1:57) And there is some, for example, in the election commission work, (2:03) there are clear indications that we have the desire and the ability to make long-term wise decisions in the center of political decision-makers. (2:17) In front of such questions, where we have to, in a situation where we have important values, (2:25) which have to be weighed, that which one goes forward, or which one is more important than the other.
(2:34) And this is very, very important. (2:39) It is very encouraging. (2:41) Fortunately, there are other EU member states that take a very, very close look at this and other things.
(2:52) But I would still say to your thought that it is certain that times and political winds change, (3:09) let's say, faster than the air, perhaps slightly slower than the weather, but not much of a difference. (3:18) I would say that probably faster than slower. (3:24) Yes.
Well, what if your association is clearly critical of this legislation, (3:32) and I can say that in the name of openness, it also relates to this very critically, (3:37) which probably has also been seen in some of your own questions. (3:43) But I also understand those who then say that, well, okay, now this law is not, or if you think that this law should not be done, (3:54) then it is not the original problem, if you think about child sexual abuse, (4:00) and specifically its material spread on the web, that it does not disappear anywhere. (4:04) So are there, on the other hand, some solutions that would go hand in hand with this privacy, (4:15) with which then these problems could be solved more efficiently today? (4:19) Yes, I will answer briefly to the end of your question that there are those, and we can talk about them in a moment.
(4:28) I would like to first take at least a couple of things before that. (4:35) One is that it is true that we relate very critically, (4:41) we respond, so to speak, to these general mass surveillance measures and proposals without the suspicion of crime, (4:59) as is usually the case, because our intention, as through our members, (5:04) is ultimately to support and be involved in developing a better digital life. (5:13) Our digital life is not as high-quality as our real life in this hand-to-hand world, (5:22) and our rights would not be fulfilled there in the near future at the level that we are used to elsewhere.
(5:33) And before that, there is still a lot of work to be done. (5:36) Actually, one question in between, when you just said the term mass surveillance, (5:41) is this the core of your criticism or response, or is it just one part of them? (5:48) But it is precisely the idea that now we should build a system (5:53) in which people would be monitored without any suspicion. (5:59) Is that the core? (6:04) Well, in this case, I would like to speak in the form of a layered hamburger.
(6:10) So it has more than one core. (6:13) I don't know how many cores there are in the end, (6:19) and how manly each one is, how much attention they require. (6:23) Other cores may be thicker than others, (6:25) but mass surveillance is definitely one of these cores.
(6:31) The other one, which is actually part of it, (6:37) is that in a free and democratic society like Finland, (6:48) the focus of official control will be on the basis of suspicion. (6:58) Not in the way that everyone is monitored at the same intensity all the time. (7:07) But people's own choices and actions will be monitored.
(7:12) And from there the indicators will rise, (7:15) to whom the official action is directed. (7:21) And this is perhaps the thickest part of the core. (7:29) And because the legislation does not really have the capacity (7:33) to provide such a possibility in the proposed form.
(7:36) But then there are precisely other cores, (7:39) one of which is, for example, (7:44) any type of official control. (7:48) If, for example, we assumed that we had a way of acting (7:52) in which surveillance could be directed to those people, (8:00) to whom we suspect the sexual abuse of a child, (8:08) or the possession of material related to it, (8:11) i.e. to enjoy this material, (8:14) then the mechanisms that the legislation produces (8:25) must be predictable in terms of effect. (8:30) So in no way should such legislation be created (8:36) if we don't know what happens when it starts to be applied.
(8:40) And that's the second core here. (8:46) The third core is perhaps even bigger in the sense that (8:53) it's not just the perspective of mass surveillance, (8:58) but it's that we have a well-functioning, (9:03) already, one might say, hundreds of years (9:08) developed human and basic rights system. (9:12) That is, a model of what values are the most important (9:15) that must be protected in society.
(9:18) So that whole must be protected, (9:25) protected from all good influences as well. (9:31) And that's because, for example, (9:35) economic activity is also based very broadly on trust. (9:44) And the way of life works on the basis of trustful messaging.
(9:52) Some secrets are more important than others. (9:55) Let's talk about company secrets or something like that. (9:58) But the daily interactions and interaction that we have, (10:03) they don't belong to three parties.
(10:06) They don't belong to competitors, (10:07) and they don't belong to anyone. (10:12) So the things that belong, (10:13) they are told on the web pages and in the news (10:17) and in social media and so on. (10:23) So that also brings to mind that if there was a target, (10:26) such a surveillance agency, (10:28) which, in practice, (10:31) would have access to all possible company secrets.
(10:35) And even if initially the system was not built (10:39) to read every single message, (10:42) but if the system is built, (10:45) as previously stated, (10:47) it's easy to add things to it. (10:49) So if there was a target (10:51) that would have access to all company secrets, (10:55) then you could say (10:58) that it would probably also increase the risk of corruption quite a lot, (11:01) because the target that would have access to it (11:06) would probably be quite a lot of providers of money or company secrets. (11:12) So if you think about what are the means (11:15) to reduce corruption, (11:17) it is to build such systems (11:20) in which officials cannot act in the wrong way.
(11:25) Or even if there is always a possibility for certain misuses, (11:28) you could say that such systems are being built (11:31) in which the misuses would not be extremely large. (11:35) Yes, definitely. (11:38) And if I think about your original question a little further, (11:44) then it's not even just about us, (11:50) although we are perhaps quite visibly present in this matter (11:54) precisely for that reason, (11:56) because our field of work is the one that produces (12:02) the elements of security for other actors in society, (12:06) in what way we can trust digital systems, (12:11) digital information systems.
(12:15) But we are, as a system, (12:19) one of the sectors of technology industry, (12:23) and we have, as a technology industry, (12:24) Finland's largest sector, (12:29) in the sense that, (12:31) if we think about the Finnish business sector, (12:36) more than half of our revenue (12:41) comes from technology industry companies in Finland, (12:46) and about one third comes from gross domestic product. (12:50) So our entire economic well-being (12:53) has been built on this stock for a very long time. (12:57) In addition, of course, there are other sectors, (13:01) such as, for example, TV and broadcasting, (13:07) i.e. the Finnish network operator and other sectors.
(13:11) They also understand quite well, (13:12) because for them, of course, (13:13) this digital e-mail is like everyday life. (13:16) They understand the risks and dangers, (13:19) what is there. (13:21) There are a lot of other actors, of course, (13:23) so I wouldn't be alone in this.
(13:27) But then, if I go to the question (13:32) of what would help. (13:35) So if we think that (13:38) if this kind of regulation doesn't go through, (13:40) then what could be the current (13:45) or easily developed solutions (13:48) that could be used? (13:50) Yes. (13:53) There are perhaps two aspects (13:55) that I would like to bring up.
(13:57) One is what this legislation (13:59) as a whole contains. (14:03) In fact, there are quite a lot of elements (14:06) that are very profitable. (14:08) Profitable.
(14:10) And those that are already being left in advance. (14:14) So now that I'm talking about following up, (14:17) anticipating, (14:18) we know that these actions (14:20) would have a positive effect (14:23) on our problem (14:24) that we are solving here. (14:27) So we are not in any way (14:28) against this whole legislation, (14:32) but only those (14:36) very harmful and dangerous (14:42) elements that it contains.
(14:46) Which are, for example, (14:48) the entirety of this early warning. (14:53) And the other thing is that (14:56) outside of this legislation (15:00) there are, of course, a lot of actions (15:02) that can be done. (15:04) Which, of course, in this way (15:07) it progresses in any way, (15:09) so there will be no change, (15:12) but they should be advanced (15:13) in some other way.
(15:16) Can you give some examples of the legislation (15:19) about the things that you think (15:20) could be profitable? (15:22) Yes. (15:22) And we have actually offered them (15:24) very broadly as well. (15:26) For example, (15:27) for those who are against (15:27) this legislation.
(15:31) We have been involved from the very beginning (15:33) when the European Commission (15:36) has already started to prepare this, (15:38) and then also during the European Parliament (15:40) process, (15:42) and now during the process of these (15:43) member states, (15:45) and so on. (15:47) They have been offered, (15:49) and some have actually been (15:52) quite good responses, (15:53) but many times in the legislation (15:55) the accuracy (15:57) and precision is a very (15:59) central issue. (16:01) And one thing that we have (16:03) considered very profitable (16:05) is that we could (16:07) rather write down (16:10) for example (16:11) the planning principles (16:16) What things (16:18) have to be above all (16:19) when these products (16:21) are offered.
(16:22) What kinds of things (16:24) should be there. (16:26) For example, (16:28) the easy and fast (16:35) reporting possibility (16:36) specifically for (16:37) maintaining these services. (16:39) A bit the same way as (16:41) in many services (16:42) through, for example, (16:42) Verkkoseläimen.
(16:46) You can report (16:49) that if you notice (16:50) something, (16:51) for example, (16:52) that this is inappropriate. (16:54) Or even on social media platforms (16:56) you can typically report (16:57) some inappropriate content. (16:59) But would those be (17:02) things that would be written (17:03) in the law, (17:04) that would then require (17:06) these applications, or what is it in practice? (17:10) Yes, exactly that.
(17:11) And then maybe even more centrally (17:12) when we talk about how (17:14) children can... (17:16) Because this kind of functionality (17:17) suits any kind of content (17:20) that is... (17:22) If a user notices that someone (17:24) is trying to cheat or (17:25) something like (17:27) for example (17:29) fraud related (17:31) cheating and (17:33) stealing money from people (17:36) in a different (17:36) way (17:36) or in a different way (17:39) then this kind of (17:42) mechanism suits that as well. (17:44) But then there are these child-friendly (17:45) planning principles as well. (17:48) Which relate to (17:50) the fact that there are technical (17:51) implementation ways, for example (17:52) to make it easy (17:55) for parents to monitor, (17:57) i.e. the ability to monitor (18:00) safe basic (18:03) settings (18:04) like for example (18:06) that (18:06) in a service (18:09) you can't send (18:11) messages to anyone (18:15) and (18:17) age is monitored (18:18) in such a way that (18:19) for example an adult (18:22) can't approach (18:23) if there is no mutual (18:24) contact or (18:26) these kinds of features.
(18:29) Of course it depends on (18:31) the messaging service (18:33) which and where (18:34) is the best. (18:36) But then there is for example (18:37) something that is already under (18:39) Europe's work, (18:40) the digital identity (18:43) which is still being (18:47) during this year. (18:50) And the basic principle is (18:51) that all Europeans (18:53) will have a fundamental (18:59) right to (19:01) and the state offers (19:03) tools to maintain (19:04) this kind of digital identity.
(19:07) And the central (19:09) functionality is (19:10) that (19:11) to identify (19:14) someone, i.e. some (19:16) features that we have, (19:19) we don't do it anymore (19:20) like we used to. (19:22) If we think that we wanted (19:23) for example tobacco or alcohol (19:26) or some age-restricted product (19:28) to buy from a store, (19:30) we used to show (19:31) a personal identification (19:33) as a whole. (19:35) There is the whole name, (19:37) there is the whole date of birth, (19:39) there is a personal ID, (19:40) there is all kinds of information.
(19:42) So through these new digital identities (19:45) we can even indicate (19:46) that I am of a certain age, (19:49) that is, I have completed 15 years (19:50) or 18 years or whatever (19:52) without having to show (19:54) to the service provider (19:56) my exact date of birth. (19:58) On the other hand, the basic thing (20:01) that we talked about earlier (20:02) is that not all (20:04) software developers would use them. (20:07) Or still, anyone can (20:08) make their own application.
(20:10) Part of the application (20:11) is not a company's, but a company's (20:14) superior. (20:15) How would that work in practice? (20:19) Would that just be (20:20) aimed at those big companies (20:22) in the future? (20:24) Because a law (20:26) that somehow obliges all (20:28) messaging applications (20:30) to work in a certain way (20:31) would seem a bit strange. (20:34) Yes, you are right.
(20:37) The thing is (20:38) that we have proposed (20:40) we have a long list (20:42) there are actually 10 different (20:46) proposals (20:46) that are good (20:48) and affordable things (20:49) most of which are possible (20:51) with this law or the law (20:53) that is in force (20:54) that we get in advance. (20:58) But then there are (20:59) these others as well. (21:01) But all in all (21:02) in all of these things (21:05) that should be done (21:06) in this problem-solving (21:09) is in such a way that (21:10) as a politician (21:13) probably many of you know (21:15) without mentioning the name (21:16) that the same lipstick (21:18) does not fit (21:19) a melon and a lemon.
(21:22) Here it is precisely (21:24) that certain (21:26) services are suitable for certain (21:28) new methods (21:30) better and certain requirements (21:32) and then again for others. (21:34) For example these that I (21:36) brought up, these are typically (21:38) suitable for (21:40) bigger ones (21:42) than then again for example (21:43) if I go back (21:45) quickly to the beginning (21:48) when I mentioned that we have (21:49) two areas (21:52) in this problem-solving (21:53) the other is the inappropriate (21:55) approaches and the other is (21:57) the material production (21:59) because when the material (22:01) is already there (22:03) it is a means of exchange (22:05) it is like a commodity (22:07) even if (22:09) it is not necessarily (22:11) euro or dollar (22:13) what it can be (22:14) for example
#####################

Title: Re: EU on CSAM: "Big Brother is watching you" (Peter Sund)
Post by: AribertDeckers on July 14, 2026, 08:22:21 AM

14.7.2026
Part 6

6 FINLAND CHAT CONTROL 2024 oj8Kj8oXfS4zMgVP

(0:00) The whole name, the whole date of birth, personal information, all kinds of information. (0:06) So, through these new digital identities, we can even show that I am of a certain age. (0:12) So, I have lived 15 years or 18 years or whatever, without having to reveal my exact date of birth to the service provider.
(0:21) On the other hand, the basic thing that we talked about earlier is that not all service developers would take advantage of these. (0:30) Or still, anyone can make their own application. (0:34) Part of the application is not a company, but some kind of a company's surplus.
(0:39) So, how would that work in practice? (0:42) Would that be aimed specifically at those big companies? (0:48) Because a law that somehow obliges all messaging applications to operate in a certain way, would seem a bit strange. (0:58) Yes, you are absolutely right. (1:00) The thing is that we have proposed, we have a fairly long list.
(1:06) There are actually ten different proposals, which are good and affordable. (1:13) Most of which is possible with this law, or with the law that is currently in force. (1:20) We will get to that sooner or later.
(1:22) But then there are, of course, these others as well. (1:25) But all in all, among all the things that should be done to solve this problem, (1:33) it is in such a way that, as a certain politician, probably many of you know him well, (1:39) but without mentioning his name, he said that the same lipstick does not suit melon and lemon. (1:46) This was precisely because certain services fit certain new methods better, (1:54) and certain requirements.
(1:56) And to others, then again, some others. (1:58) For example, these that I brought up, these typically fit perhaps these larger ones. (2:05) When then again, for example, if I go back to the beginning, (2:12) when I mentioned that we have two areas in this problem set.
(2:17) The other is the inappropriate approaches, and the other is the material production. (2:23) Because when the material is already there, then it is a means of exchange. (2:29) It's like a commodity, even if it's not necessarily a euro or a dollar, (2:37) what it might be.
(2:38) It's like, for example, this kind of oral leather type of business. (2:43) Give me that material, I'll give you this as well, and so on. (2:46) But all in all, this business and this material distribution, (2:51) it is again practiced on the other side, for example, in a dark network.
(2:54) And there are completely different strategies, (3:01) authorities and plans for those owned by the Navy Administration. (3:04) Just as it is now being done effectively, (3:08) to prevent illegal smuggling. (3:10) So there are somehow their own things.
(3:13) Then there are their own things for large vessels, (3:16) and then there are their own things for smaller ones, (3:20) which can work better in that context. (3:25) It is important to remember that the central point of the social problem (3:35) is where the first victim or the first victimization is born. (3:43) And now, if we understand this, then we can decide quite well, (3:49) and in fact, this is known from research as well, (3:52) that these people, these individuals, (3:58) they operate and operate on the basis where others are.
(4:03) So the victims, potential victims, children. (4:06) And they are in these large, generally used services, (4:11) not in any borderline, (4:13) but on the basis of a central message exchange. (4:19) And that's why it's important that we focus on those active activities (4:24) in these different entities in such a way that they affect.
(4:28) Yes, if you think about it like that, (4:31) there can be separate applications where these people, (4:37) who have the material from the child, (4:39) exchange that material in between. (4:41) But then there is precisely that, (4:45) if you think about where that material originally, (4:47) or how it gets its start, (4:49) then there is always an interaction with those children, (4:53) which would then be very important, (4:56) that there would be a lack of opportunity for that, (4:59) so that there would not be the material that distributes it forward. (5:02) Yes, just like that.
(5:04) And one suggestion that we have taken quite well, (5:07) is that when we think about how harmful follow-ups (5:13) there are in society more broadly, (5:15) and that is that, for example, in Finland, (5:18) we now unfortunately have this situation, (5:22) where law enforcement or the authorities, (5:24) for example the police, (5:25) cannot act covertly on the prevention of these crimes. (5:31) That is, to appear as a young person or a child, (5:39) so that these kind of seducers (5:46) would be much easier to find. (5:50) In the United States, this seems to be possible.
(5:53) And it is in the law. (5:54) In our neighborhood, the pretty good results are from that. (5:58) Because then, if we think about the entire user population, (6:03) that is, everyone in Finland is a social media user, (6:11) or a user of these big news platforms, (6:13) certainly by throwing at least three and a half million, (6:17) most of them Finns, all in all.
(6:19) So, if there is someone there, (6:23) who appears as a child, but is actually a police officer, (6:32) then it is not very harmful to other users. (6:37) Versus the fact that all people, all media, (6:40) would be investigated in advance. (6:44) Yes, those two can be easily seen.
(6:47) In my opinion, it is possible to understand the logic (6:52) behind that. (6:54) Then again, I guess that someone might throw (6:57) a counter-argument to that. (6:59) That if the authorities in their own actions (7:01) dare to commit crimes against others, (7:04) then it is problematic in itself.
(7:07) And then how do those two things then balance each other. (7:11) Because in the same way, it could be thrown that (7:13) if it was approved or approved there, (7:16) would it be okay then that the authorities (7:19) would start, for example, to buy or sell drugs (7:23) and then use it to harass those who buy or sell. (7:25) How much would the authorities be allowed, (7:30) or in this case the police, to commit crimes (7:35) or do things that would encourage others to commit crimes? (7:40) Yes, it is a kind of constant discussion level, (7:46) which is very important to maintain in the future.
(7:52) This is a kind of inquiry that is necessary (7:55) if these kinds of changes are going to be considered (7:59) at the practical level. (8:02) And luckily that is the case. (8:04) But we can of course now, at this table, (8:08) as I have already said, that this is actually the case (8:10) for other types of crime.
(8:12) So yes, in Finland too, the police act covertly (8:17) in the case of other serious crimes, (8:19) such as homosexual crime, mental crime and many others. (8:23) This is done, and this has been accepted in society. (8:29) So this inquiry has already been done (8:31) in the case of these crimes and types of crime, (8:37) and it is known how it is practiced (8:39) and where the boundaries of action are, (8:42) what is incitement and what is actually (8:45) a confession of a crime.
(8:50) Of course, there is quite a big difference (8:56) in the end. (8:58) But all in all, in this discussion, (9:02) we don't necessarily need to go too far into that, (9:06) because we have mechanisms in place for that, (9:09) but it is of course a very important point. (9:12) And then there is perhaps what, if you think about (9:15) the arguments that have been answered, (9:17) that if then someone, for example, (9:21) appears as a minor or as a child, (9:24) and then an adult talks to him, (9:26) then has a crime actually occurred (9:29) if he had not been a minor? (9:31) And in the same way, I think there was also (9:33) something that was answered, (9:34) that if this goes a little past the subject, (9:37) but that someone had cheated on another person (9:41) in such a way that it was a pleasant (9:45) crime, which was still only a minor, (9:49) but then still, and would it be like (9:52) that person got some kind of punishment (9:53) for some fraud, which in a certain way (9:56) can be said to be quite exciting, (9:57) that you get a criminal punishment for not (9:58) selling a real crime.
(10:00) But now I don't remember that the person (10:03) who had bought this, (10:05) did he get any follow-up at all, (10:07) because in fact, he didn't buy the (10:10) crime if he had just gotten some (10:11) punishment for it. (10:13) So in itself, in my opinion, that is (10:14) quite, even again, I can well understand (10:18) why this kind of covert action is then (10:20) practiced in certain situations, (10:22) and I don't say that I would initially (10:24) be against it, but I think it is (10:26) still such a, if you think a little (10:30) more broadly, philosophically, (10:32) or so, it is still a reason to think (10:36) about where the limit of the crime (10:38) accusation is then drawn. (10:40) Is it enough that a crime could have (10:43) happened here, or should there (10:46) actually be a crime? (10:48) Yes, just like that.
(10:49) And that is a very, very important (10:52) area or whole here. (10:57) In my opinion, it is also the case that (10:59) we should not leave these things (11:02) entirely to our own experts, (11:06) but we do need more discussion in (11:08) society about such things, (11:11) because here it is also the (11:14) matter of respect. (11:16) I myself think that there are a lot of (11:19) opportunities for success in the (11:20) follow-up of the accusers, when the (11:24) respect and consideration is done (11:26) carefully, so that we can avoid (11:30) a very harmful and serious (11:32) phenomenon, (11:35) such as, for example, the victimization (11:39) of children.
(11:40) In that sense, but it is not a (11:43) left-handed thing, of course. (11:47) And from what you said, (11:54) how can it then be done (11:56) so that we are fortunately in the (11:58) realm of justice, and above all, (12:08) there is a lot of knowledge and ways (12:13) to deal with such things in the (12:15) If I take now, for example, (12:17) that now, for example, the latest (12:22) school shooting in Finland, which (12:24) happened in Viertola, Vantaa, and the (12:27) pre-investigation material has now (12:28) become public here yesterday and today, (12:33) and there is, in a certain way, one (12:36) aspect of a similar phenomenon, (12:40) and that is, for example, the (12:42) planning and preparation of a (12:47) Has it been based on, and (12:50) what mechanisms have been used in (12:54) its criminalization, or a similar (12:57) thing, for example, the criminalization of (12:59) crimes related to terrorism, (13:03) or the criminalization of actions, (13:07) so there are the same elements (13:09) have been considered, how it should be (13:12) so that it is carried out sufficiently (13:15) limitedly, but still sufficiently (13:17) effectively, its main measure. (13:21) In my opinion, it is completely (13:23) justified that if someone plans and (13:27) prepares for committing a crime, (13:30) it would be better for society that (13:33) the action is stopped before the (13:36) person has carried out this act.
(13:40) Yes, I feel that this is an issue that (13:42) everyone, without a doubt, agrees on, (13:44) that if it is possible to somehow (13:49) stop it, then you don't want to wait (13:51) until someone has been murdered and (13:53) after that you can say, okay, now a (13:55) crime is happening, you don't have to (13:56) think about whether it was just a (13:57) plan or not. But still, in my opinion, (14:00) it is essential to think about where (14:05) the line is, that if someone, for (14:09) example, in a coma, shoots something, (14:14) just shoots something that doesn't (14:16) really mean anything, will it be fulfilled? (14:19) So that the authorities can say that (14:22) now we are really, really sure that (14:25) this is a justified suspicion, so I feel (14:27) that there must be some kind of a limit (14:30) that no matter what, they can't (14:33) put a stop to it. (14:34) Yes, that's right, and that's how it is, (14:36) that we have both in the legislation (14:40) for example in the criminal law (14:42) statute, there are very precisely these (14:47) different kind of assumptions and these (14:49) elements that are then called (14:56) identification as a crime, if (14:58) such a fine word is used.
But the (15:01) point is still that also in terms of (15:05) official actions, there are (15:08) there are different levels of suspicion, and when we take into account the entire criminal process up to the trial, (15:14) we actually have quite a lot of other, higher levels of suspicion, (15:20) which have to be overcome before a person is brought to trial for a crime. (15:26) The fact that the authorities start to investigate something has to have a certain level to it. (15:32) It can't be anything, and then it goes to the final level, (15:36) that the judge finds that there is no other reasonable suspicion left, (15:44) that this person would not have done this crime.
(15:49) And then I started to think about it. (15:50) This was the first thought that came to mind. (15:52) Soon I will argue against myself.
(15:54) But the thought that came to mind was that, (15:57) okay, in principle, the authorities could miss out on things before they were illegal. (16:04) You shouldn't necessarily require a direct link to that. (16:07) But on the other hand, when you think about it, (16:09) if something is not actually illegal, (16:14) is it possible for the authorities to miss out on it? (16:17) If someone acts according to the law at that moment, (16:21) is it possible for the authorities to come in between and say, (16:24) now this is going to be stopped? (16:27) How do you deal with that? (16:29) And that's exactly what I started to think about, (16:31) in these hidden cases.
(16:35) Because I'm sure all reasonable people think that (16:41) if the authorities had the opportunity to ensure that children would be used in a good way, (16:46) and not just wait until someone acts and then they are arrested, (16:52) if there were such pre-possibility opportunities, (16:55) it would be good to use them. (16:56) Of course, this again returns to the theme of this episode, (17:01) that how totalitarian actions are required (17:06) so that certain crimes can be prevented, (17:08) that's one thing. (17:09) But if we find ways (17:11) where we don't have to use authoritarian or totalitarian means of surveillance, (17:21) where we can prevent crime, (17:24) then those are great.
(17:27) Yes, yes. (17:27) And if we somehow try to bring that together (17:32) to the end of this theme, (17:36) I would say that the levels of seriousness of different actions (17:47) are usually related, (17:51) or in practice, they should always be related (17:55) to those action alternatives. (18:00) So, if I take a childlike example, (18:08) that in the street of disorderly behaviour, (18:11) which involves threatening behaviour and so on, (18:14) there is a lack of preventive police in Finland as well.
(18:21) And we don't expect that to go terribly badly for someone, (18:25) but the means by which it is lacked (18:28) are not necessarily the same as what would be used, (18:32) for example, in a situation where someone would be (18:35) already trying to take another person's life. (18:40) So, there are very clear... (18:44) Or let's say, for example, (18:46) even though there has been a lot of talk in Finland (18:49) about criminal activity and so on, (18:52) there are those action alternatives, (18:56) but they are not the same as those (18:59) that are included in these gangs (19:02) for the study of individual people's serious crimes, (19:06) or even in advance, maybe, (19:08) if it is necessary or possible to do it before it happens. (19:14) Like, for example, if we take the drug trade or something, (19:19) of course, we want to do it in such a way (19:21) that the drugs are put in the hands of the authorities.
(19:25) That the trade is not allowed to take place (19:27) if it is known where and when it happens, (19:29) so that the drugs end up in either street shop, (19:32) even if the seller would have been responsible for it. (19:38) And so on. (19:39) There are a lot of those, (19:41) and it would certainly be a really good episode.
(19:45) One quick point about the cover operation. (19:48) I just remembered what you said. (19:49) I think it was also a good example, (19:51) this threatening situation on the street.
(19:54) At least you could imagine a law (19:58) where the authorities would have the right (20:01) to practice a cover operation (20:03) and somehow face the person who then, (20:07) or try to find out who it is, (20:09) even if it was not yet, (20:12) that even in that situation, (20:14) there would not have been a crime. (20:15) That final crime. (20:17) That final crime.
(20:18) Somehow to make such a law (20:20) in a bit of the same way, (20:21) when this goes a little bit to another theme, (20:28) but for example, (20:29) at the moment, (20:30) using cannabis is legal, (20:32) but in Helsinki, (20:34) it is not necessarily allowed. (20:37) But in principle, (20:39) an official would have the opportunity (20:42) to resort to it. (20:43) In Portugal, (20:46) the law is such that (20:49) the official has the right (20:52) to somehow guide the person (20:53) to help.
(20:56) So in a similar way, (20:57) one might think that it would be (20:59) very difficult to respond, (21:01) or I don't know, (21:03) maybe someone can come up with an argument, (21:04) but even a law that would then (21:05) give the official the opportunity (21:08) to do a cover operation, (21:10) and if there is a person (21:11) who is not systematic, (21:14) or who does not practice it systematically, (21:16) that some big crime league boss, (21:19) but in a certain sense, (21:21) a simple officer, (21:22) then the official would have the opportunity (21:25) to guide that person (21:28) to some help, (21:29) or to some extent, (21:31) in such a way that it would stop its operation. (21:34) Or something like that. (21:35) And yes, we actually have those in Finland.
(21:38) There are several (21:38) types of crime, (21:42) or criminal use. (21:43) There are various types of (21:46) criminal use, (21:47) according to the law. (21:48) In Finland, there is also (21:52) such a mechanism.
(21:55) But if you put it all together, (21:57) even if this CSAM law (21:59) would not pass, (22:02) you could say that (22:03) there are other ways (22:04) to deal with the original problem, (22:08) that is, the use of children, (22:10) and the use of materials (22:12) to spread the material. (22:13) There would be means to avoid that. (22:15) Yes, that's right.
(22:17) However, the fact that in the (22:19) sexual mind, the adult (22:21) is interested in the child, (22:26) medically speaking, (22:27) I dare say that (22:28) it can be held (22:31) as an exception. (22:34) And through that, (22:36) there is also (22:38) treatment for that. (22:38) But if a person (22:41) really does or (22:42) tries to do things (22:45) stably, where there is (22:46) this victim, which (22:48) is a question of protecting (22:49) all the time, (22:52) that is, what we can (22:54) and what we should do in society (22:56) so that we (22:58) don't have (22:59) victims of this kind of action.
(23:02) It's in the core (23:04) all the time. (23:06) And in that sense, (23:08) that those (23:10) people who (23:14) hunt down (23:16) victims, attract (23:19) children (23:20) as a victim, (23:23) so (23:24) I take it (23:26) as a reasonable thought (23:28) that (23:29) we carefully (23:31) figure out what we could (23:33) still do (23:36) stably (23:37) in that (23:39) situation. (23:41) And then it comes to my mind (23:42) that, well, in the US (23:45) apparently this kind of (23:46) cover-up is practiced, but there (23:48) it is also (23:51) read that there may be some (23:53) individual people or small groups (23:55) who actually (23:57) start to hunt down (23:58) these bad guys.
And then (24:00) sometimes even in such a way (24:02) that then they go to keep bad (24:03) and so on. Although I feel that (24:06) the moral of an average person (24:09) may be such that (24:10) if then already some child (24:12) gets mixed up in a fight, then it (24:14) may not necessarily be such a thing (24:16) that would make me feel worse (24:18) about it. But basically (24:19) such a situation where people (24:22) take the law into their own hands (24:24) was the basic reason for whatever.
(24:26) I can say that it is (24:30) and it is (24:31) precisely (24:32) a risk for it to grow if (24:34) officials then don't take care of (24:36) their own money well enough and (24:38) take care of their own property well enough. (24:40) So that's why it could be based on (24:42) that officials really should (24:44) think about those (24:47) effective means, (24:48) not those things that just look good on paper, (24:51) but truly effective means (24:52) so that they don't end up in a situation (24:54) where then the citizens (24:56) themselves would start hunting these. (24:58) Yes, just like that.
(24:59) In a certain way, (25:02) the vaga cup is (25:04) what you described, (25:06) that if (25:07) some social (25:09) processes and structures (25:12) don't (25:14) solve (25:15) such important problems, (25:18) then there is a risk that (25:19) then in society an event (25:21) will be dictated, that it will be (25:23) solved by other means, (25:25) and loneliness is (25:27) a kind of restrictive (25:29) national activism, (25:31) if you could (25:31) call it that. (25:35) But of course, (25:38) to some extent, (25:39) and here we will also come to (25:41) the properties (25:42) of these media platforms, (25:46) that it, for example, (25:47) makes it easy to (25:50) notice (25:53) that they are (25:54) it is very (25:56) important, (25:57) just because you don't need it yourself, (25:59) because (26:02) those different, (26:04) especially those (26:05) scamming companies, (26:07) they have such huge (26:08) numbers (26:10) that (26:11) there is no sense (26:16) in them, (26:16) and it might not even (26:17) succeed with such (26:21) national (26:24) vigilantism (26:24) or whatever terms (26:26) are used for it. (26:27) It is important that information is (26:30) passed on, that it ends up (26:31) as a systematic process, (26:33) and ultimately, (26:34) these criminal organizations (26:35) are dismantled, as it happens.
(26:40) And then again, (26:42) if we think that, (26:43) but of course, such national (26:44) activism can also be useful, (26:46) like, for example, these (26:47) misdemeanors, (26:49) to which official resources (26:51) or law enforcement resources (26:53) have not been used much (26:55) lately, (26:58) like, for example, (26:59) bicycle theft, or some (27:00) vehicle theft, and such. (27:03) And in those, (27:04) such media platforms (27:07) have even been quite effective, (27:09) that people (27:11) have actively, (27:14) for example, (27:15) tried to find on the internet (27:17) for example (27:19) bicycles or donated cars (27:21) or something. (27:23) So if a bicycle or a car has been stolen, (27:25) then where is the (27:27) sales announcement on the matter? (27:29) Yes, for example.
(27:31) But the point is still (27:33) that there must (27:35) be reasonable (27:37) and easy-to-use (27:39) ways to get (27:41) the matter somehow (27:42) to an appropriate decision. (27:45) So that (27:47) a citizen (27:48) would not have to (27:51) try to get (27:52) the stolen car (27:54) from someone's (27:57) yard. (27:58) It is more likely to have a worse (28:00) follow-up than a good follow-up.
(28:03) Generally speaking. (28:04) Yes, I have three (28:07) themes that come to mind here. (28:10) Now we are probably (28:11) already at the end of the episode, (28:14) otherwise, but (28:14) one argument (28:16) against CSM (28:18) that I have come across is that (28:21) this in the end games (28:22) really does not serve (28:25) the original purpose, (28:26) that there would be a thing that (28:28) would look good on paper, and then (28:30) politicians could say that (28:32) now we have done something, (28:34) but in practice, however, (28:35) it would not change anything.
(28:38) Another thing that still came to mind (28:40) is what do you think (28:41) in today's (28:44) society, (28:45) in today's world, (28:46) the responsibility of parents
############################

Title: Re: EU on CSAM: "Big Brother is watching you" (Peter Sund)
Post by: AribertDeckers on July 14, 2026, 08:46:41 AM

14.7.2026
Part 7 (the end of the video)

7 FINLAND CHAT CONTROL 2024 oj8Kj8oXfS4zMgVP

(0:00) Especially these fraud companies, there are so many of them, that it doesn't make sense, (0:13) and it wouldn't be possible with a kind of national vigilance, or whatever terms are used. (0:24) It's important to pass on this information, so that it ends up in a systematic process, (0:30) and ultimately in the dismantling of these criminal organizations, as it happens. (0:36) And then on the other hand, if we think about it, but there is also benefit from such national activities, (0:42) like for example these kind of frauds, where official resources, or law enforcement resources, (0:50) haven't been used much lately, like for example bicycle theft, or some vehicle theft, and such.
(1:00) And in those, the messaging platforms have even been quite effective. (1:07) People have actively, for example, tried to find on the internet, for example bicycles, or donated cars, or something. (1:19) So if a bicycle or a car has been stolen, then where is the sales announcement on the matter? (1:25) Yes, for example.
(1:26) But the point is still that there has to be reasonable, easy-to-use ways to get the matter to a reasonable conclusion. (1:42) So that a citizen wouldn't have to try to get the stolen car from someone else's yard. (1:54) Then it's probably going to be a worse follow-up than a good follow-up.
(2:00) Generally speaking, something like that. (2:02) Yes, I have three themes that come to mind here. (2:06) Now we're probably starting to get to the end of the episode already, but (2:11) one argument against CSAM that I've come across is that (2:17) this doesn't really serve the original purpose in the end.
(2:23) That it would be something that would look good on paper, and then the politicians could say that (2:28) now we've done something, but in practice it wouldn't change anything. (2:35) Another thing that came to mind is what do you think is the responsibility of the parents in today's society, (2:41) in today's world, and in what way, if there are young children, (2:49) where should they be aware of everything, and how well do you think parents in general are aware of (2:55) how the children might be subject to different kinds of dangers in different applications. (3:02) And the last thing that comes to mind, or theme, in this whole, is then artificial intelligence.
(3:07) What is the significance of artificial intelligence in the context of this discussion? (3:13) But if we start with the first one. (3:18) Yes, of course. (3:21) If I try to intensify the two main challenges of the current legislation, (3:30) they relate to the effectiveness of the legislation, and then to its vulnerability.
(3:39) So this legislation, as it is now being processed, is not effective. (3:48) So it doesn't lead to better protection for children. (3:53) That's the conclusion.
(3:58) So in other words, an important and good goal, but the means to achieve it are wrong or ineffective. (4:09) Can you somehow intensify it for the sake of clarification, why would this be weak in your opinion? (4:15) Well, this effectiveness is due to the fact that in this legislation there are (4:25) these limitations. (4:30) Intentional and perhaps unintentional limitations.
(4:36) And they first of all relate to the fact that we are trying to target this surveillance only to pre-identified material. (4:49) So then everything that is created is new. (4:53) And also what happens in this incessant interaction, as I mentioned at the beginning, (5:00) this kind of web-hooking, which in English is called grooming, (5:08) this legislation does not address either of these in its entirety.
(5:14) But only to pre-identified material that is already under the control of the authorities. (5:20) So it is extremely narrow. (5:23) In addition, it is also narrowed by the means that these technical solutions that we are going to use here, (5:32) as we talked about earlier, they do not work effectively.
(5:38) And in addition, they are, I dare say, I'm a little careful and I'd like to say that it's difficult, (5:48) but I say that it's quite easy for a motivated operator to circumvent these controls. (5:56) And then there is this misuse problem and risk. (6:02) And so on.
(6:03) There are a lot of these. (6:05) And then, of course, also the fact that this does not only apply to certain applications, (6:11) certain service providers and only those operating in a certain management model. (6:17) So, for example, it is not thought of that there is a company as an operator and so on.
(6:26) So there are many such adventures. (6:30) And then there is this other direction, (6:33) from which I said that when this legislation is not effective. (6:42) And then the other is this violation.
(6:46) But at the same time, regardless of the above mentioned, (6:52) we are still creating mechanisms that are in practice de facto mass surveillance (7:00) and the trustworthiness of the message, which is the basic right of all of us, (7:07) to break it down in a de facto way. (7:10) So if in some way this tightens your connection and your connection, (7:16) then it is that now this bill in practice, if it were to be implemented, (7:21) it would lead to a situation where interpersonal privacy would be broken, (7:26) mass surveillance would begin, this kind of large-scale surveillance-type mass surveillance. (7:32) But regardless of the initial problem, i.e. the sexual abuse of children, (7:38) it would not be possible to effectively eliminate the threat in any way.
(7:41) Just like that. (7:44) Absolutely. (7:44) And then, of course, when we think about the part of artificial intelligence as a whole, (7:56) I see two things in it.
(7:59) One is the idea that artificial intelligence systems could somehow help in the near future (8:15) in the recognition of unauthorized material and so on. (8:23) It's one direction. (8:24) But the central problem is that we talked earlier during this episode (8:32) about the third important thing, not just about efficiency and vulnerability, (8:41) but also about the predictability of surveillance.
(8:47) The fact that we hope that technology will somehow develop in some direction (8:53) and create some opportunities, that is not a wise principle for setting up legislation. (9:02) We should be very, very, very careful in that regard. (9:06) Just like we have in other legislation, (9:08) more and more society prefers to legislate quality impact assessment.
(9:14) Before regulations are created in society, we must know what to follow. (9:19) And the idea that we hope that some technology will develop and work in the right way (9:25) is nothing but smart. (9:27) Do you think that the situation with CSAM at the moment, (9:31) that somehow the idea is that the recognition algorithms in the future (9:38) are probably good enough? (9:41) Well, a little bit in that direction.
(9:43) Especially the idea of artificial intelligence, (9:46) if in an artificial intelligence system the algorithms are just one layer of the whole, (9:53) then there should still be very long-term machine learning-related basics, (10:01) and there should still be high-quality data and all kinds of other things (10:06) that would somehow lead to, for example, (10:09) if the data in the criminal case is changed, (10:15) like image manipulation or something like that, (10:18) can the systems still operate in the desired way? (10:24) And that opens the other direction. (10:27) That is, artificial intelligence systems are already now, (10:30) and tomorrow they will be easier to use, (10:34) for example, in the manipulation of the criminal case very easily, (10:42) so that somehow this recognition could be avoided, (10:46) so that they would not remain a target of these recognition systems. (10:52) Because artificial intelligence is a long-term automating work, (10:58) even though all of it would now necessarily be purely artificial intelligence, (11:02) but only by automating the processing of large amounts of data, (11:12) it gives great opportunities also to lawless and criminal offenders (11:19) to avoid that, I don't want to say imprisonment, (11:25) but to end up in the hands of the authorities.
(11:30) So what if you think about artificial intelligence, (11:33) or specifically generative artificial intelligence, (11:36) for example, DALL-E or Mid-Journey, (11:38) such responsive services that can then produce images, (11:43) these are now better known from commercial versions, (11:46) but then there are a lot of others, (11:49) so what is the significance of artificial intelligence (11:50) in generating and producing this kind of modern, (11:58) or at least at the EU level, or at the level of law enforcement, (12:01) at the central level? (12:04) Well, as far as I know, there is currently no specific discussion that would be used, (12:12) but of course it is so that the EU's artificial intelligence attitude (12:18) is such that it has come to power, (12:22) where it is very precisely determined (12:25) what purposes artificial intelligence systems can be used for, (12:30) how their risk level, or the risk basis, (12:39) no action must be taken on the basis of it, (12:46) so that the risks of the use of artificial intelligence systems are under control. (12:54) And of course, if these purposes, (12:57) that is, the creation of images and images, (13:01) is of course a completely normal and very reasonable use, (13:08) then the criteria for the EU's artificial intelligence attitude (13:12) must be applied and it must be clarified (13:16) where the boundaries of forbidden use will be crossed, (13:23) and then what other requirements, (13:25) if they can be used for a certain purpose. (13:30) But what is your opinion on the fact that, (13:33) even though commercial forces will always censor (13:37) or filter this kind of morally questionable content, (13:41) it seems to me that this is very easy to see, (13:44) but at the same time, these models based on open source code (13:49) are getting better and better all the time, (13:51) so could it be that in the future, (13:55) we are in a situation where, regardless of all the regulations, (14:01) we have in practice, (14:02) or I speak more broadly to society now, (14:05) that we have in practice models (14:07) that can basically create very simply any image.
(14:13) And it's very, very difficult to miss that. (14:15) Yes, I do think that the scenario is very possible. (14:24) I don't dare to say anything about the probability yet, (14:28) but I think it's very possible.
(14:30) Because now, for example, (14:33) when it comes to regulation or above all laws, (14:37) they now apply to those actors (14:40) who initially want to act according to the law. (14:45) And we now have such things as (14:48) AI that can be used, (14:50) that is, accessible to various users, (14:59) who can, for example, create a code of conduct, (15:03) that is, in practice, a code of conduct for viruses and so on. (15:08) It is of course clear that such action is very questionable (15:17) and not legal, (15:19) but if there is a criminal act in general, (15:24) such as providing unauthorized services, (15:26) whether it is an artificial intelligence service (15:29) or some more traditional sexual services (15:38) or something like that, (15:39) partly because they are legal, (15:42) then these will more than likely still be there.
(15:50) Because you can imagine that, again, (15:51) initially criminals or those people who are not interested in (15:58) whether something is moral or legal, (16:01) then again, the law does not necessarily press them. (16:05) Yes, yes, I see that. (16:08) Of course, one of the strategic measures is (16:17) that the more aggressive or smaller, (16:20) as they can be limited, (16:22) the smaller the harmful consequences are.
(16:27) Of course, the more limited the use of the team is, (16:30) in general, whatever it is, (16:33) putting there powerful lasers or artificial intelligence systems (16:38) or shooting guns or whatever, (16:42) or incitement agents or so on, (16:43) then it does matter. (16:47) But still, the continuation question in a certain way is that (16:52) if it is limited to creating such an image (16:54) where there have never been real people, (16:59) then how harmful is it? (17:02) And if it is harmful, (17:04) then on what grounds is it harmful (17:06) and what can be said about it? (17:09) I think this is a very, very important question (17:15) in this discussion, because (17:17) well, everyone, as was mentioned earlier, (17:21) everyone thinks that if there is a victim, (17:26) that if a child is victimized, (17:27) then it is automatically wrong and so on. (17:30) But then if there is a question of creating a digital image (17:34) that does not connect to anyone, to the right person, (17:37) then the attitude changes.
(17:39) Although I do understand that (17:42) such a backbone reaction, probably, (17:45) for the vast majority of people, (17:46) is that it is imaginable, (17:49) it feels wrong, it feels bad. (17:53) So it is immoral and it should be legal or criminal. (17:56) And it is a very strong emotional reaction.
(18:00) And then if you want to argue it a little longer, (18:03) then I can also see the concern or fear (18:06) that if there were some people who then, (18:11) it would be generally acceptable that (18:13) well, some people then look at this, (18:15) then the concern may be that (18:16) can the consumption of a certain kind of content (18:19) lead to the fact that those people would also want (18:23) to fulfill their desires in the real world. (18:27) So the fear or concern that (18:28) even if now some content would be consumed (18:31) that does not have a connection to the real world, (18:34) then can the link be formed through this. (18:38) However, now I do not know if there is any research (18:41) that would go in that direction, (18:43) because then again someone else could say (18:44) that if certain people only have the opportunity (18:50) to consume such digital content, (18:53) then they never need to be in the real world.
(18:56) But now I have to say that I do not know (18:57) how it really goes, (18:59) that this should then be asked from some real psychiatrist (19:02) or someone who would then... (19:04) Yes, it may be that there is quite an excellent (19:08) topic for the second episode. (19:11) I would think so, because if I myself (19:15) just bring up a few such preliminaries, (19:19) then I get like three questions in mind, (19:24) whether it is really possible (19:25) that such an artificial imagery and material (19:30) could work as part of the solution to this problem. (19:36) I am not proposing it, nor am I presenting it, (19:39) but I will present it as a bold question at this point.
(19:43) And then again, if we think about what follows, (19:48) whether it can be used (19:50) as a solution for these individuals, (19:56) was it in 1978, or what could be the year (20:01) when Rambo I came from the TV (20:03) or to the movies? (20:05) And I'm not quite sure how much... (20:08) Is it an addition to the number of war crazy people (20:11) who want to fight in the woods as survivors (20:15) or against real evil authorities? (20:21) I'm not sure about that. (20:23) This is a good question, (20:25) but I suspect that it may not be entirely radical. (20:28) If you think about how much... (20:30) Of course, there are real people, (20:32) actors have been involved, (20:34) but if we continue in a certain way the idea (20:36) that we have some Marvel universe (20:39) that has been in the limelight for many decades, (20:45) where there have been no real people, (20:46) not even actors, (20:50) did it lead to some kind of (20:52) Batman vigil, (20:54) a kind of self-governing law enforcement, (20:58) or something.
(21:00) And now, of course, (21:02) there are probably people in the audience (21:03) who are wondering (21:04) that Boomer talks about the Marvel universe (21:08) and Batman, of course, at the same time. (21:10) I emphasize that I am aware (21:12) that they are from different universes. (21:14) But all in all, (21:17) the other superheroes are a bit like that, (21:21) and named after them, (21:22) and others who, according to the law, (21:25) save the humanity and the world (21:27) all the time.
(21:28) Or if you think about the Rattlesnake games, (21:31) which probably... (21:32) Yes, yes. (21:33) Actually, I don't know if most of the boys (21:36) would have played them, (21:37) but I would guess that part, (21:40) or it would be really, (21:41) in any case, a high percentage, (21:44) and whether it has led to (21:45) the fact that youth is a violence itself. (21:50) You could say that at the moment (21:51) youth violence is growing, (21:53) and it is a concern, (21:54) but whether it has links (21:58) to the Rattlesnake games, (21:59) that's another matter.
(22:00) There is a lot of research and experts, (22:04) very deep experts, (22:06) I myself know a lot of (22:10) several experts in that field, (22:16) and I'm pretty sure (22:18) that there is a lot of (22:21) based opinion. (22:24) But all in all, (22:27) what is artificially created, (22:30) where there are no living people (22:32) who have ever been involved, (22:34) what can be stated as a fact (22:36) is in any case that (22:39) there are at least no victims. (22:41) I guess that (22:42) if you compare it a little (22:46) like this, (22:47) that the human brain (22:48) in a way, (22:52) or I don't know (22:53) how well (22:54) we generally understand (22:57) that something is virtual (22:59) and not real.
(23:01) That the same (23:04) enthusiasm, (23:06) or that kind of enthusiasm, (23:07) or that excitement, (23:09) or in any case a strong (23:10) negative emotional reaction (23:13) to the fact that (23:14) it is so strong (23:18) that it easily (23:20) drives (23:21) in a certain way (23:22) away from what (23:23) the real world effect is. (23:26) And in my opinion, (23:26) it would be very (23:28) at least important to think about it (23:30) from the perspective of (23:31) what leads to the end result (23:34) where (23:36) children in real life (23:39) are treated (23:40) as a possible victim. (23:42) So to think about it from that perspective (23:44) and not just (23:46) from the perspective of (23:47) what is the first (23:50) emotional reaction to it.
(23:52) Yes. (23:53) Yes, I can (23:55) clarify it myself. (23:57) Was it the 60s (23:59) in the United States when (24:00) according to my memory (24:02) for the first time, (24:04) could it even be the end of the 50s, (24:07) so (24:09) was this researcher's (24:10) last name Kinsi (24:13) who (24:15) published (24:15) for the first time (24:19) people's sexuality (24:24) as (24:25) a (24:25) hidden (24:27) research.
(24:28) And it was a radical (24:31) massacre (24:31) straight away. (24:33) Before that (24:36) each of us (24:39) assumed (24:40) that there is only one way (24:41) to be sexual (24:42) and it has to be (24:46) the same for everyone. (24:46) But it turned out (24:49) that this was not the case.
(24:51) And it has been a long (24:52) time for these days. (24:56) From this (24:56) my continuation is (24:58) very similar (25:00) to you. (25:03) I think (25:04) that it would be (25:07) important to ask (25:08) that here comes (25:10) once again (25:11) the fundamental question (25:14) from which we started (25:16) where is (25:17) the boundary (25:18) between the social (25:18) and the individual? (25:24) What is (25:26) acceptable to the society (25:28) and what is not? (25:30) And there (25:30) the question is (25:34) where (25:35) is the problem (25:42) for (25:42) other (25:45) people? (25:46) And to some extent (25:47) there is also (25:49) of course the (25:50) tolerance to at least be (25:51) involved in considering (25:52) what kind of behavior (25:54) is very harmful (25:56) to the individual.
(25:59) But as we know (26:00) for example in Finland (26:03) for example (26:04) spitting one's own (26:05) breath is not (26:07) a crime. (26:09) Even though it is one of the most harmful (26:11) things you can do to your own life. (26:15) Yes.
(26:16) And in a certain way (26:17) we get to Janne's link (26:19) also for example in terms of (26:21) criminal proceedings. (26:22) In a way it feels a bit absurd (26:24) that if the idea (26:27) even though I don't otherwise (26:28) take criminal proceedings (26:30) but if the idea that (26:32) we protect individuals (26:34) from committing (26:36) criminal offences (26:37) then all the other ways (26:39) you can physically harm yourself (26:42) or spitting one's own breath (26:44) are completely legal. (26:45) In a way it is Janne's paradox.
(26:48) Yes, we have (26:50) quite large market forces (26:52) who dare to (26:54) eat a huge amount of sugar. (26:59) It is quite harmful (27:01) to our individuals. (27:03) But maybe we came quite far (27:05) from the (27:08) CSAM (27:08) bill.
(27:10) These are still (27:12) the basic requirements (27:14) in this matter as well. (27:16) Thank you for that. (27:18) Maybe a short (27:19) one minute (27:21) about what Janne said.
(27:27) Well (27:28) in that sense (27:30) I don't have (27:31) much more to say. (27:37) Of course it depends (27:39) on how (27:41) the listeners (27:42) perceive (27:44) the central themes (27:46) that we have discussed (27:50) most of all (27:51) in terms of (27:53) the properties (27:55) or the effects (27:58) of the bill (27:59) still (27:59) they focus (28:03) precisely on (28:03) that this is (28:06) harmful to society (28:08) this does not solve (28:10) the problem (28:11) we have (28:14) and it is also (28:18) invaluable (28:20) Alright, we'll put the package in. (28:22) Peter, many thanks for the interview.

(28:24) Thank you. (28:25) Vaalit podcast is now running. (28:28) All supporters of Vaalit podcast (28:30) can buy their own interview.

(28:32) If you want your own podcast (28:34) episode, contact (28:35) vaalit at puhemedia.fi (28:38) In the first episode (28:39) I interviewed Niko Haapala. (28:42) Niko Haapalainen is the (28:43) municipal election candidate in Tampere. (28:46) If you are from Tampere, (28:48) watch Niko's interview.

(28:49) So if you are from Tampere, (28:52) watch Niko's interview. (28:54) The link can be found in the episode description.
#################

END OF VIDEO

Folia lib. ... Freiheitliche Blätter

Die Ursachen allen Übels => Der alltägliche Feudalfaschismus => Topic started by: AribertDeckers on July 12, 2026, 01:14:28 AM